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ARTICLES 
PROTECTION OF PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTORS UNDER THE 
DODD-FRANK ACT 
Doris Toyou* 
ABSTRACT 
In securities law, investor protection means that an issuer of securities, 
here partnership interests for private equity, must register with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and be subject to disclosure, reporting, 
record-keeping compliance and examination programs. This Article argues 
that the Dodd-Frank Act has fulfilled part of its objective to protect private 
equity investors by forcing private equity managers to disclose information 
on their operations. Disclosure has provided greater transparency about 
how the business of private equity is conducted. The increased SEC scrutiny 
started in 2014 has uncovered unfair practices and violations of fiduciary 
duties that sophisticated investors could not detect on their own. 
Notwithstanding this improved transparency, the Dodd-Frank Act still falls 
short of imposing the main tool securities laws uses to protect investors: that 
is, full and fair disclosure. In other words, Dodd-Frank does not provide all 
the required protections that are important for investors to assess the quality 
of their investments and make informed decisions. This Article offers to 
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expand transparency by additional public disclosure of investment returns, 
fees, and managers’ income. 
For other policy issues unrelated to the protection of investors, that is, 
jobs or tax, Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act does not offer the appropriate 
setting. Applying or enacting legislation concerning tax, labor or bankruptcy 
laws can better curve the controversial practices of private equity firms.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Although no evidence was put forth that private equity funds 
represented a threat to the financial system or the entire economy, Treasury 
Secretary Timothy Geithner described the economic situation prevailing in 
September 2008 in the following way: 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were put into government conservatorship. Lehman 
Brothers collapsed. Merrill Lynch, Wachovia and Washington Mutual were 
acquired in distress. A $62 billion-dollar money market fund “broke the buck.” 
The world’s largest insurer avoided bankruptcy only with the help of $85 billion 
in emergency aid. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley announced they would 
protect themselves by becoming bank holding companies. When Congress’ first 
attempt to pass the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) failed, the 
stock market took a historic plunge. 
In a matter of just three months, five trillion dollars of Americans’ household 
wealth evaporated. Economic activity and trade around the world ground toward 
a halt.1 
In 2009, confronted with the worst financial crisis since the Great 
Depression, the new Obama administration and Congress decided to regulate 
advisers to private equity, venture capital and hedge funds (“private funds”). 
The choice to regulate private funds exhibited a new regulatory approach to 
the financial system, the goal of which was to assess any risk to the markets 
and understand how all its players interacted. Thus, financial players, even 
those dealing with sophisticated investors, would conduct their business 
within the regulatory framework of the securities laws. 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(hereinafter “Dodd-Frank,” “Dodd-Frank Act” or the “Act”),2 enacted in 
2010, regulates, for the first-time, advisers to private equity funds. It closed 
the regulation gap between retail investors and sophisticated investors as all 
investment advisers, with some exceptions, were required to register with 
regulators. By doing this, the Act realized a regulation overhaul long in the 
making. 
                                                                                                                           
 
1 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Sec’y Timothy F. Geithner Written Testimony House 
Financial Services Committee Financial Regulatory Reform (Sept. 23, 2009) (on file with author), 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg296.aspx. 
2 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010). 
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Title IV of Dodd-Frank, entitled “Regulation of Advisers to Hedge 
Funds and Others,” contains most of the sections that regulate advisers to 
hedge funds, private equity, and venture capital funds. With only fourteen 
sections, Title IV’s regulation relies mostly on the rulemaking authority of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereafter “SEC” or 
“Commission”). 
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act amends the Investment Advisers Act of 
1940 by adding a “Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act.” The 
scope of the regulation focuses on the “public interest,” the “protection of 
investors,” and the “assessment of systemic risk,” with these words appearing 
in Title IV and repeated throughout the Act. 
Critics of this regulation argued that systemic risk—risk associated with 
the interconnection of financial systems3—was not caused by private equity 
(or private funds) but was the result of poor regulatory enforcement on 
financial institutions. Conversely, those in favor of regulating private 
equity—and private funds—viewed the Dodd-Frank Act as an important step 
forward to more transparency for complex financial investments (delivering 
protection for investors).4 
In Part I, this Article first provides a brief background on private equity 
funds, their organization and structure, and how they compare with other 
common private funds (venture capital and hedge funds). Part II highlights 
policy issues specific to private equity and discusses the use of debt, jobs, 
                                                                                                                           
 
3 See, e.g., Hedge Funds, Systemic Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008: Written Testimony 
of Andrew W. Lo Prepared for the H. Comm. on Oversight on Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 2–5 (2008) 
(Statement of Andrew Lo, Harris & Harris Group Professor, MIT Sloan School of Management.), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1301217 (Explaining systemic risk and noting that 
financial markets do not need more regulation but more effective regulation. This implies that hedge funds 
and other intermediaries part of the “shadow banking” system to provide more transparency on 
information related to assets under management, leverage, liquidity, counterparties, and their holdings. 
The shadow banking system “consisting of investment banks, hedge funds, mutual funds, insurance 
companies, pension funds, endowments and foundations, and various broker/dealers and related 
intermediaries.”). 
4 See generally Cary Martin, Is Systemic Risk Prevention the New Paradigm? A Proposal to Expand 
Investor Protection Principles to the Hedge Fund Industry, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 87, 101 (2012) 
(Arguing the focus on systemic risk by Dodd-Frank has eclipsed the need for investor protection, even 
and particularly for sophisticated investors dealing with hedge funds.); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 205–06 (2008) (An important goal of securities laws is regulating 
financial risk, which requires efficiency in capital markets. Thus, regulating systemic risk is part of that 
same goal.). 
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fees and the controversy on tax laws. Part III describes the Dodd-Frank Act 
and in Part IV, this Article concludes with the enforcement activities made 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission and offers steps to achieve 
better disclosures for investors. 
I. PRIVATE EQUITY AND PRIVATE FUNDS 
Private equity funds, a segment of leveraged buyouts (“LBOs”), 
attracted national attention when in 1989 Kholberg Kravis & Roberts 
(“KKR”) acquired RJR Nabisco, then a conglomerate selling food and 
tobacco products with iconic brands such as Oreo, Ritz Crackers and Winston 
cigarettes.5 Private equity acquisitions of companies are often associated with 
greed, lay-offs, asset stripping and bankruptcy, frequently resulting from 
leveraged buy-out debts.6 Buyout activities, which are a segment of private 
equity, tend to overshadow other positive impact private equity financing can 
generate.7 
Private equity can be defined as capital raised by private sources rather 
than public fundraising to finance the acquisition of companies on behalf of 
                                                                                                                           
 
5 See generally BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF 
RJR NABISCO 308, 515, 537, 542 (20th ed. 2009) (Relating the $25 billion RJR Nabisco deal, the biggest 
LBO at the time.). Private equity is remodeling the leveraged buyout business of the 1980s, relying 
essentially on debt as the pillar of the financing mechanism by using what are essentially junk-bonds. 
These are high-risk securities (bonds below investment grade of a rating agency) producing high-yields 
(returns). In the 1980s the investment bank Drexel Burnham Lambert (“Drexel”), under the leadership of 
Michael Milken and Leon Black spurred the junk-bonds market by selling junk-bonds to companies to 
finance leveraged buyouts deals. In the early 1990s, this model was discredited when many deals financed 
by junk-bonds defaulted, triggering the saving-and-loan crisis and a government bailout. Ultimately, 
Drexel collapsed and filed for bankruptcy protection. Because of the collapse of the junk-bond market, 
LBO principals had to find other venues to finance their deals and ultimately turned to commercial banks. 
In addition, and to distance themselves from the junk-bonds route and no longer be seen as “Barbarians,” 
LBO principals rebranded their industry and named themselves “private equity” firms in lieu of LBO 
firms. Unlike its competitors, Ted Forstmann, another investor of that era and archival of KKR, fervently 
opposed the excessive use of debt (junk-bonds) to finance deals. He believed the “junk-bond cartel” had 
risen to prominence since Ron Perelman’s took-over Revlon. With KKR bidding RJR Nabisco, Forstmann 
pictured the “junk-bond hordes” at the city gates and by contrast to junk-bonds, he could use “real money” 
to stop them once and for all by standing at the bridge of the city gates and push the barbarians back. 
6 Id. 
7 CYRIL DEMARIA, INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE EQUITY xviii, 15 (1st ed. 2010) (A fundamental 
difference between U.S. and Europe is the use of private equity to describe buyout transactions. Europeans 
tend to differentiate buyout with other private equity type capital increases that include venture capital 
and expansion capital, turn-around or other strategies.). 
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qualified investors.8 Private equity includes several subparts of financing 
such as venture capital, growth equity, buyout or distressed funds.9 Private 
equity and venture capital are often used interchangeably.10 However, private 
equity today describes funds using mainly debt to acquire controlling interest 
in stable companies, while venture capital funds invest in early stage, mid-
stage, and late capital and finance acquisitions with equity. As we will see, 
the Dodd-Frank Act11 makes a clear distinction between venture capital and 
private equity and provides two separate regulatory regimes. 
Investment managers, also known as sponsors, raise capital with 
investors to create one or several private equity funds. Fund managers 
manage private equity funds typically structured as General Partners or other 
managing entities (collectively designed “GP” or “GPs”). GPs act on behalf 
of the investment fund.12 The management company, affiliated with the GP, 
provides investment advisory services to the fund. The investment advisory, 
composed of founders and investment professionals of the private equity 
firm, provides daily operational activities to the fund (valuation of 
investment opportunities, administration).13 
                                                                                                                           
 
8 Id. at 15–16 (A comprehensive definition includes a negotiated investment in equity or quasi-
equity for a fixed maximum term implying specific risks with high expected returns, undertaken on behalf 
of qualified investors.). 
9 See, e.g., SCOTT W. NAIDECH, PRIVATE EQUITY FUND FORMATION 1 (2011), https://www 
.msaworldwide.com/Naidech_PrivateEquityFundFormation_Nov11.pdf (Growth equity funds invest in 
later stage companies generally before a public offering or for PIPE transactions, which are private 
investment in public equity. Distressed funds, also called vulture invest in distressed companies to 
purchase debt securities at a steep discount.); see also DEMARIA, supra note 7, at 78 (Angel investors, 
usually high net worth individuals, provide seed capital for small businesses before venture capital 
intervene.). 
10 See PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 3 (2d ed. 1999) (The 
authors note the “distinction between venture capital and private equity funds is not precise. Private equity 
funds include funds devoted to venture capital, leverage buyouts, consolidations, mezzanine and 
distressed debt investments, and a variety of hybrids such as venture leasing and venture factoring. 
Venture capital funds are those devoted to equity or equity-linked investments in young growth-oriented 
firms. Many venture capital funds, however, occasionally make other types of private equity 
investments.”); see generally GEORGE W. FENN ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF THE PRIVATE EQUITY 
MARKET, FED. RES. BULL. 28 (Dec. 2015) (The authors alternate denominations between venture capital 
and “non-venture private equity.”); see also HARRY CENDROWSKI ET AL., PRIVATE EQUITY, HISTORY, 
GOVERNANCE AND OPERATION 3 (2d ed. 2012) (The introduction chapter includes buyout and venture 
capital to define private equity transactions.). 
11 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, supra note 2 (Title IV: 
Regulation of Advisers to Hedge Funds and Others). 
12 NAIDECH, supra note 9, at 2. 
13 Id. 
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Private equity firms through their affiliates, usually GPs or managers, 
manage private equity funds. Thus, private equity firms are distinct entities 
from private equity funds.14 Private equity funds are closed-ended investment 
vehicles that limit fundraising of investors’ capital commitment for a period 
spanning from twelve to eighteen months.15 After this fundraising period, the 
fund does not accept additional investor commitments.16 The fund itself pools 
capital and has no other operations. 
Private equity funds are structured as limited partnerships (LPs) or 
limited liability companies (LLCs), which provide tax and legal flexibility. 
LPs and LLCs are pass through entities, meaning they do not pay corporate 
income taxes. Instead, the corporate income passes through to individual 
partners and is taxed at the individual partner level.17 Pass-through structures 
avoid double taxation (corporate and individual).18 LPs and LLCs also 
provide flexibility in organizing the legal structure because most statutory 
provisions are default rules and can be replaced by agreements. In addition, 
LPs and LLCs offer limited liability to investors (limited partners or 
members), meaning their liability exists only for their capital contribution 
and they have no personal liability for the fund’s debt.19 
Since 2007, in order to raise additional cash from traditional venues, 
three large private equity firms have set a new trend by listing part of their 
business in the public stock exchange. The firms are Fortress Investment 
Group, Och-Ziff, and Blackstone.20 Private equity firms go public in two 
                                                                                                                           
 
14 See, e.g., Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 121, 123 (2009) (Explaining the distinction made between private equity firms, private equity 
funds, and private equity transactions.). 
15 NAIDECH, supra note 9, at 2. 
16 Id. 
17 26 U.S.C. § 701 (2018). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, THIRD AMENDED AND RESTATED LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
AGREEMENT OF FORTRESS INVESTMENT GROUP LLC (2008), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
1380393/000095013608001568/file2.htm; SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AGREEMENT OF OCH-ZIFF CAPITAL MANAGEMENT GROUP (2007), http:// 
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1403256/000119312508064885/dex32.htm; see also SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, FORM S-1 REGISTRATION STATEMENT UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933: THE 
BLACKSTONE GROUP L.P. (2007), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1393818/ 
000104746907002068/a2176832zs-1.htm; see, e.g., Orit Gadiesh et al., When Private Equity Goes Public, 
FORBES (June 15, 2007, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/2007/06/14/bain-private-equity-oped-
cx_og_0615bain.html#7306fb861bff (for press coverage on private equity going public); Gregory 
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different ways: either by offering a piece of the management company to the 
public, or by floating shares in the private equity fund. The public can buy 
and sell shares of private equity firms in the public market.21 Unlike most 
companies traded on a stock exchange and organized as corporations, private 
equity firms list their shares as unincorporated companies taking the form of 
limited partnership or limited liability companies. This results in asymmetry 
between public corporations and unincorporated companies since public 
corporations have to conform with fiduciary duties whereas public 
nonincorporated companies (at least in Delaware) can waive these duties.22 
The structures of Fortress and Och-Ziff resemble a public corporation while 
Blackstone is closer to a privately-held company.23 
A. Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Venture capital and private equity are sometimes used interchangeably 
to describe a pool of funds that are utilized to invest in early stage versus 
those established companies.24 Technically, venture capital monies go 
towards early, mid- or late-stage businesses without a significant track 
record. This presents risk, but also potential for high rewards.25 Successful 
companies having benefited from venture capital investing include Apple 
Computer, Intel, Federal Express, Microsoft, Sun Microsystems, Compaq, 
and many others.26 Like private equity, venture capital firms employ 
professionally managed firms taking equity positions in private companies at 
                                                                                                                           
 
Zucherman, For Private-Equity Clients, Worries Over Public Listing, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2011), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304231204576406052688509710 (Long-term 
investors worrying that short-term results could hamper focus on long term perspective when private 
equity and hedge fund firms go public.); Jeffrey Goldfarb, Ten Years After Going Public, Blackstone Stock 
Hasn’t Budged, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/22/ 
business/dealbook/ten-years-after-going-public-blackstone-stock-hasnt-budged.html (Blackstone’s share 
trades at the same $31 per share ten years after the initial public offering. The result seems modest and 
does not outperform the S&P.). 
21 Mohsen Manesh, Legal Asymmetry and the End of Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465, 469 
(2009) (Arguing the 2007 public offerings of Blackstone, Fortress Investment Group and Och-Ziff have 
democratized private equity.). 
22 Id. at 470. 
23 Id. at 486. 
24 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 10. 
25 William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J. 
FIN. ECON. 473 (1990). 
26 Id. at 482 (These companies have received early stage venture capital money, then went public.). 
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different stages of their development.27 Both venture capital and private 
equity serve as intermediaries acting on behalf of investors. 
Venture capital and private equity typically structure as LPs with GPs 
acting as fund managers, with funds having the same characteristics (same 
finite life, same institutional investors’ profile, and same cyclical fundraising 
activities).28 Venture capital and private equity managers also use the two 
twenty compensation (two for management fees and twenty for profits or 
value creation). However, unlike private equity, venture capitalists do not 
charge their portfolio companies with monitoring or other transaction fees. 
Private equity and venture capital also maintain significant differences. 
Venture capital and private equity invest in different types of companies: 
venture capitalists invest in companies that do not have discretionary cash to 
back up the service of debt service and its objective aims at value creation.29 
In particular, venture capitalists invest in startups, and they do not use long-
term leverage or short-term funding to finance their portfolio companies. 
They use cash in return for an equity share of the company’s stock. There is 
no use of leverage because startups cannot bear debt interest payments and 
often cannot present enough collateral.30 The risk generated by venture 
capital is entrepreneurial and technological, with a failure of approximatively 
one-third of companies in a portfolio.31 In contrast, private equity typically 
invests in companies with solid cash flow, whose cash flow can sustain the 
payment of debt service. Here, the objective considers streamlining a 
company’s operations for better efficiency and profitability.32 
Finally, the venture capital industry provides information to the SEC, as 
limited partnerships are securities (as defined by the Securities Act of 1933)33 
                                                                                                                           
 
27 Id.; see also JAMES L. PLUMMER, QED REPORT ON VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 
11–12 (1987) (Explaining that stages of venture capital include seed investments, start up, first, second, 
third, fourth stages and liquidity.). 
28 Sahlman, supra note 25, at 517. 
29 See id. 
30 Regulating Hedge Funds and Other Private Inv. Pools: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., 
Ins., and Inv. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th. Cong. 63 (2009) (Statement of 
Trevor R. Loy, Founder and General Partner, Flywheel Ventures.) [hereinafter Regulating Hedge Funds 
and Other Private Investment Hearing]. 
31 Id. See also Sahlman, supra note 25, at 482 (some failures of venture capital investments include 
Ovation Technologies, Osborne Computer, Ztel, and Gavalian). 
32 Id. 
33 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (2018). 
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and fund offerings must either be registered under that act or find an 
exemption.34 Funds usually rely on the private sale offerings and Rule 506 
that provides an exemption from registering securities with the SEC.35 Rule 
506 imposes filing Form D—a disclosure document with information about 
the fund, its advisers, its investors, and securities sold.36 
B. Private Equity and Hedge Funds 
Hedge funds are often compared to unregulated mutual funds.37 They 
are blind pools seeking positive return. They differ from private equity with 
different features. Hedge funds have immediate funds in cash, contrary to 
private equity funds, which receive capital contributions and commitments 
from their investors.38 Unlike private equity, hedge funds accept new 
investors into the fund and existing investors can participate in the fund 
periodically.39 Also, unlike private equity, which distributes proceeds to 
investors after liquidation of an investment, hedge funds usually sell assets 
and reinvest the funds periodically.40 While private equity investors usually 
cannot sell their partnership interest until a period of time has concluded (up 
to ten years), hedge fund investors may redeem their interest after a “lock-
up” period of one year or more.41 Further, hedge funds are private investment 
funds for the wealthy that require minimum investment amounts, many to 
reach hundreds of thousands or more. Mutual funds are public investment 
funds generally open to all, or most investors. 
                                                                                                                           
 
34 See Regulating Hedge Funds and Other Private Investment Hearing, supra note 30, at 65. 
35 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982). 
36 See Regulating Hedge Funds and Other Private Investment Hearing, supra note 30, at 65–66 
(Venture capital industry has always opposed regulation because they believe they are already regulated 
with disclosure made to the SEC and subjecting the venture capital industry to additional SEC registration 
could damage its activity. The argument is that the economic contribution by venture capital cannot justify 
the need for more regulation that “could hamper venture activity.”). 
37 E.g., Fast Answers: Hedge Funds, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/ 
answers/hedge.htm (Hedge funds are more flexible than mutual funds and use strategies such as leverage, 
short selling and speculative investment that is not allowed by mutual funds. Mutual funds are regulated 
unlike hedge funds, which regulation does provide all the protections to investors (such as disclosure).). 
38 NAIDECH, supra note 9, at 18 (Typically, an investor subscribes to capital commitment to a fund. 
Payment do not occur at once but in installments until fully subscribed.). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N: OFFICE OF INV’R EDUC. AND ADVOCACY, SEC PUB. NO. 139, INV’R 
BULLETIN: HEDGE FUNDS 2 (2012). 
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Private equity and hedge funds sometimes converge as both seek to 
expand their activities beyond their original scope. For instance, private 
equity buyout managers now invest in debt and financial instruments such as 
options, credit instruments or derivatives42—a business once conducted by 
hedge fund managers. Conversely, hedge fund managers can invest in private 
funds and compete for the same business as private equity firms.43 
C. Structure of Private Equity Funds and Limited Investor Protection 
Private equity funds structure as LPs and LLCs and form mostly in the 
state of Delaware. Delaware statutes44 have fiduciary rules that codify 
common law fiduciary duties (that is, the duty of care, the duty of loyalty, 
and the obligation of fair dealing).45 In Delaware, fiduciary duties are default 
                                                                                                                           
 
42 William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, One Hat Too Many? Investment Desegregation 
in Private Equity, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 45, 48 (2009) (Noting big buyout firms like Blackstone, Apollo, 
KKR, or Carlyle, raise new funds specialized in alternative assets.). 
43 See Jonathan Bevilacqua, Convergence and Divergence: Blurring the Lines Between Hedge 
Funds and Private Equity, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 251, 262–63 (2006) (Noting that hedge funds take active role 
in companies’ management the same way that private equity managers do.). 
44 See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 
663, 666 (1974) (Delaware corporate laws have achieved prominence in America because Delaware 
enables managements of companies to operate without interference and has eliminated the rights of 
shareholders, leading to “the race for the bottom” to emulate Delaware’s success.); see also NAIDECH, 
supra note 9, at 3 (Stating that large and complex transactions occur in Delaware as it is a familiar and 
safe jurisdiction for investors. Delaware’s courts have expertise, experience, and the State is considered 
one of the most sophisticated in the United States. In addition, the low cost of administrative process and 
service providers make Delaware an attractive state.). 
45 See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (The laws of partnership mirror the 
agency relationships existing between an agent and its principal, where the agent owes the principal 
fiduciary duty. The duty of loyalty is met when the partner offers opportunity, full and fair chance to allow 
its fellow partners to capitalize on the opportunity.); see also Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) 
§ 404(b)(2) (1997). Under RUPA, the only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership and other 
partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care as set forth in subsections (b) and (c). Id. at § 15-
103(b)(3). The duties of loyalty and care are not waivable, nor can they be eliminated in the partnership 
agreement. Id. at § 15-103(b)(3)(i). However, agreements between partners may identify specific types or 
categories of activities not deemed in violation of the duties. 
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rules46 and nonincorporated entities such as LPs or LLCs can reduce or 
eliminate them.47 
Thus, consistent with the freedom of contract principle, Delaware 
enables LPs and LLCs to eliminate their fiduciary duty.48 Parties’ sole 
obligation consists of maintaining an implied contractual covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in their contractual relationship. 
Some scholars applaud Delaware’s flexibility and its contractarian 
view,49 which they argue best serves the interest of parties, including passive 
investors. Limited partnership agreements provide very little protection for 
investors, and managers have no legal duty to conduct business in the best 
interest of their investors.50 Unlike shareholders of incorporated companies, 
investors in limited partnerships have less power since there is no mandatory 
oversight body imposed on managers.51 As Delaware partnerships have no 
mandatory fiduciary duties, investors may face abuse, which can take the 
form of excessive management fees, self-dealing or other practices.52 If an 
agreement waives the fiduciary duty, managers have little obligations than 
those expressly put forth in the limited partnership agreement.53 Carefully 
drafting the limited partnership agreement and “reputational constraints” on 
                                                                                                                           
 
46 See generally Srinivas M. Raju & Jillian G. Remming, Fiduciary Duties in the Alternative Entity 
Context, A.B.A. (Aug. 16, 2012), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/ 
commercial-business/articles/2012/fiduciary-duties-in-alternative-entity-context/, http://apps 
.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/commercial/articles/summer2012-0812-fiduciary-duties-
alternative-entity.html. 
47 See 6 DEL. CODE § 17-1101(d) (2006) (For LLCs language almost identical with Section 18-
1101(c): “To the extent that, at law or in equity, a partner or other person has duties (including fiduciary 
duties) to a limited partnership or to another partner . . . the partner’s or other person’s duties may be 
expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the partnership agreement; provided that the 
partnership agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.”). 
48 See David Rosenberg, Venture Capital Limited Partnerships: A Study in Freedom of Contract, 
2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 363, 388 (2002) (As documented by the author, an agreement suppressing 
fiduciary duties may state the following, “[t]he general partners assume no duties to the limited partners 
except those explicitly herein.”). 
49 Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American 
Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1093 (2003) (Noting the U.S. venture capital experience is 
overwhelmingly a product of private ordering, an extremely effective contracting structure covering all 
phases of venture capital investing.). 
50 Rosenberg, supra note 48, at 367. 
51 Id. at 383. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 390. 
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managers would best protect investors.54 Thus, the importance of reputation 
suffices to encourage managers to act in the best interest of LPs.55 
Reputational constraints act as a deterrent that may counterbalance any 
mistreatment by managers.56 Likewise, limited partners observe reputational 
constraints by limiting their interventions in the business of the fund57 and 
seem “wary of being perceived as litigious,” which could limit their 
participation in future investments.58 
Other scholars consider private ordering ineffective to solve agency 
problems created by the limited partnership structure.59 GPs and LPs often 
have divergent interests.60 Resolving agency conflicts can occur with strong 
legal checks on agents by private enforcement or by monitoring through 
contract design.61 Reputation alone cannot deter unscrupulous behaviors 
from GPs or LPs.62 Examinations and enforcement activities done by the SEC 
since 2014 confirm that strong enforcement better resolves agency issues.63 
For instance, after the examination of fees and expenses of private equity 
firms, violations of law or material weakness appeared over 50% of the 
time.64 
Since the Dodd-Frank Act, advisers to private equity (and private funds) 
with over $150 million in assets under management must register with the 
SEC and submit to reporting, recordkeeping and examination. Below $150 
                                                                                                                           
 
54 Id. at 373. 
55 Id. at 366 (In the context of venture capital, Delaware laws creates the best environment to 
incentivize managers to well perform because their reputation is at stake.). 
56 Id. at 373. 
57 Id. at 394. 
58 Id. 
59 See generally Lee Harris, A Critical Theory of Private Equity, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 259 (2010). 
60 Id. at 263 (GPs might want to hide information, redirect resources for personal benefits or spend 
more time in other matters not related to current LPs’ while LPs want GPs to work exclusively for the 
fund, identify investment opportunities.). 
61 Id. (Resolving agency problems of divergent interests of managers and investors can occur with 
strong legal checks on agents or by private enforcement or by monitoring through contract design.). 
62 Id. at 288–90. 
63 See Andrew J. Bowden, Dir., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N: OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND 
EXAMINATIONS, Spreading Sunshine in Private Equity, Speech at Private Equity International (PEI) 
Private Fund Compliance Forum 2014 (May 6, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014--
spch05062014ab.html (In general, limited partnership agreements are often too vague for important issues 
such as fees, expenses. Disclosures to investors are minimum. Valuation also poses the issue of clarity for 
procedures and methods used. Finally, agreements do not provide LPs with enough information and rights 
to monitor their investments.). 
64 Id. 
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million, registration and regulation are made with the state, that is, if the state 
has an investment adviser scheme. The SEC may enforce cases based on 
violation of fiduciary duties for those investment advisers registered with it. 
Under the Advisers Act, advisers are prohibited from using schemes or other 
forms of artifice to defraud their clients or prospective clients.65 The 
prohibition extends to fraudulent, deceptive and manipulative business 
conducts. Since 2014, the SEC has rightfully used this provision against 
private equity firms to enforce this aspect of investor protection.66 
D. The Sophisticated Investor Dilemma 
Securities regulations require the registration of the purchase and sales 
of securities with the SEC. A “security”67 has a broad definition that 
encompasses various types of investment vehicles such as stocks, bonds, and 
limited partnership interests in the case of private equity. The sale and 
purchase of securities, such as a partnership interest, triggers several 
securities laws:68 the Securities Act of 193369 (“Securities Act”), the 
                                                                                                                           
 
65 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the mails 
or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly—(1) to employ any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client; (2) to engage in any transaction, practice, 
or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client; (3) acting 
as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any security to or purchase any security from a client, 
or acting as broker for a person other than such client, knowingly to effect any sale or purchase of any 
security for the account of such client, without disclosing to such client in writing before the completion 
of such transaction the capacity in which he is acting and obtaining the consent of the client to such 
transaction. The prohibitions of this paragraph (3) shall not apply to any transaction with a customer of a 
broker or dealer if such broker or dealer is not acting as an investment adviser in relation to such 
transaction; or (4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or 
manipulative. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this paragraph (4) by rules and regulations 
define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses of business 
as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.”). 
66 See generally infra Part III; see generally Roberta S. Karmel, The Challenge of Fiduciary 
Regulation: The Investment Advisers Act after Seventy-Five Years, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 
405, 410 (2016) (The enactment of Investment Advisers Act and an early U.S. Supreme Court decision 
has emboldened the SEC to bring actions against fraudulent practices by investment advisers.). 
67 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (2018) (Statutory definition provided by the Securities Act of 1933.). 
68 See James C. Spindler, How Private is Private Equity, and at What Cost?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
311, 320 (2009) (Arguing how easy it was for private equity to opt out of securities regulation.); see Vijay 
Sekhon, Can the Rich Fend for Themselves: Inconsistent Treatment of Wealthy Investors under the Private 
Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 6 (2011); see also Martin, 
supra note 4, at 95 (Hedge funds used the same exemptions than private equity.). 
69 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.S. § 77 et seq. 
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Securities Exchange Act of 193470 (“Exchange Act”), the Investment 
Company Act71 (“Investment Company Act”), and the Investment Advisers 
Act of 194072 (“Investment Advisers Act”). 
The Securities Act requires registration with the SEC and makes it 
unlawful to offer or sell securities without registration unless an exemption 
applies. Private equity sponsors have used the private placement exemption 
offered to accredited investors to escape registration.73 These are institutions 
or individuals with a net worth in excess of $1,000,000. 
To avoid registration under the Investment Company Act, sponsors 
needed to limit the number of beneficial owners to one hundred or have 
“accredited investors.”74 
Under the Advisers Act, private equity could avoid registration by 
relying on the exemption for investment advisers with fewer than fifteen 
clients who did not hold themselves out as investment advisers and did not 
register as investment companies.75 The fifteen-client requirement counts the 
funds as clients rather than the individual investors in each fund.76 
Private equity advisers preferred to opt out of securities regulation 
because regulation triggers obligations to disclose information,77 and to 
maintain books and records that the SEC can examine and inspect.78 
Registration also provides rights of action and penalties for violation of 
disclosed obligations.79 
                                                                                                                           
 
70 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 et seq. 
71 Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq., 80a-3 (An investment Company 
“means any issuer which—(A) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage 
primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities; (B) is engaged or proposes to 
engage in the business of issuing face-amount certificates of the installment type, or has been engaged in 
such business and has any such certificate outstanding; or (C) is engaged or proposes to engage in the 
business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to 
acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of such issuer’s total 
assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis.”). 
72 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq. 
73 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.215, 230.501 (definitions used in Regulation D); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.173. 
74 Id. 
75 Investment Advisers Act § 203(b)(3) (1970). 
76 See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Invalidating the SEC ruling requiring 
that investors of a hedge fund be counted as clients of the fund’s adviser instead of the fund itself, to 
benefit from the fewer than fifteen clients’ exemption of the Investment Advisers Act registration.). 
77 Investment Advisers Act § 206. 
78 Id. 
79 Spindler, supra note 68, at 320. 
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Prior to Dodd-Frank, all exemptions were geared towards sophisticated 
investors, generally defined according to their wealth or knowledge. Because 
of perceived sophistication of these investors, the rationale implied that they 
did not need the kind of protection offered by the registration statement (often 
a prospectus) so long as these investors demonstrated the ability “to fend for 
themselves.”80 An investor can fend for himself if he shows access to the 
same kind of information found in a registration statement, and have the 
expertise and sophistication to evaluate it. 
Investors in private equity and private funds are sophisticated investors. 
No statutory definition of sophisticated investors exists. However, courts and 
securities regulations make the distinction between those who possess 
financial education and wealth as opposed to those who do not.81 Typically, 
private equity investors are pension funds, endowments and foundations, 
banks and insurance companies and wealthy individuals.82 
The issue of applying wealth as a proxy of sophistication has proven 
inadequate.83 If anything, the financial crisis of 2008 has taught us that wealth 
does not equal sophistication. The same institutions that invested in 
sophisticated financial products, that is banks, insurance companies, and 
wealthy individuals, counted among those begging for government subsidies 
when their investments collapsed.84 In addition, there is a huge difference in 
                                                                                                                           
 
80 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). 
81 See C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 
DUKE L.J. 1081, 1083 (1988) (securities laws barely refer to investor sophistication, but in fact, courts 
make a distinction between investors depending on whether they are sophisticated or unsophisticated). 
82 See, e.g., FENN ET AL., supra note 10, at 45–49 (Noting the expansion of pensions funds and 
endowments as the largest group to hold private equity. Investors usually invest alongside a private equity 
group through a limited partnership, then investors can co-invest to gain experience in deal structuring, 
monitoring and exit options. Eventually, investors decide to invest directly on their own without 
intermediary.). 
83 Greg Oguss, Note and Comment, Should Size or Wealth Equal Sophistication in Federal 
Securities Laws?, 107 NW. L REV. 285, 294 (2012) (Arguing that investor sophistication based on wealth 
is obsolete and dangerous. Wealth and size have proven poor proxies for investor protection and 
investment products are too many and complicated to provide enough protection.). 
84 John E. Girouard, The Sophisticated Investor Farce, FORBES (Mar. 24, 2009, 12:30 PM), https:// 
www.forbes.com/2009/03/24/accredited-investor-sec-personal-finance-financial-advisor-network-net-
worth.html#42d093ec184b (Blaming the financial crisis not on “crooks, risk-junkies or incompetent 
regulators” but on the legal system that “says people who have or control a lot of money are automatically 
smarter than the little guy and therefore don’t need as much protection.”). 
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sophistication among those deemed sophisticated investors85 and even within 
just one portion of an individual institution. For instance, a private equity 
fund can have investors composed of endowments, public or pension funds, 
banks, and insurance companies. Endowments have a reputation for selecting 
the best managers, providing higher investment returns compared to banks 
or insurance companies.86 Within the category of endowment, it is also hard 
to believe that an endowment of three hundred million has the same 
sophistication as a ten-billion-dollar endowment. Investors can also process 
information differently.87 
In theory, these sophisticated investors are rich enough to invest in 
private equity or hedge funds, but they do not have the same expertise with 
investing in funds and definitely do not have the same bargaining power with 
managers. Yet, they are all considered sophisticated.88 
As previously mentioned, the protection of investors was not the sole 
purpose of regulating private equity. The government has revealed its 
intentions since the late 1980s due to controversies surrounding the private 
equity industry. 
                                                                                                                           
 
85 See generally Josh Lerner et al., Smart Institutions, Foolish Choices? The Limited Partner 
Performance Puzzle, 62 J. FIN. 731, 731 (2007) (Returns limited partners realized from private equity 
differs across institutions. A reason might be some investors can better understand financial information 
and make better choices.). 
86 Id. at 733 (Returns are based on internal rate of returns—which can bias results. Other 
measurements include the value of actual distributions received by investors, or stated value of the fund.). 
87 See Troy A. Parades, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for 
Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. REV. 417 (2003) (The effectiveness of securities laws depends on 
disclosure and how the disclosed information is used. Thus, how investors use the information is as useful 
as the disclosure itself.). 
88 See Regulating Hedge Funds and Other Private Investment Hearing, supra note 30, at 77–81 
(Testimony of Joseph A. Dear, Chief Investment Officer of California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System (“Calpers”). Calpers is the largest public pension fund in the United States. It has invested in 
various private pools. In 2008, it represented approximatively $180 billion market value with annual 
payout obligations over $10 billion to California retirees. Calpers has invested in private equity since 1990 
and in hedge funds since 2002 because Calpers believes private pools are good investments as they 
diversified its investment portfolio, and this created significant value. However, in 2009, Calpers 
welcomed an increased transparency for investors and regulators to detect fraud and reduce risks to the 
financial system. In particular, Calpers recommended that all funds (that included hedge funds, private 
equity, investment companies, advisers and brokers) register with the SEC as investment advisers and be 
subject to the Commission’s oversight. Advisers had to make regular disclosures to regulators on a real-
time basis, while disclosure to investors and the market could be on a delayed basis. Finally, investment 
advisers and brokers who provided investment advice to customers had to be held to the fiduciary 
standards of care and loyalty.). 
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II. POLICY ISSUES WITH PRIVATE EQUITY ECONOMICS 
Today, the influence of private equity firms goes beyond the circle of 
American corporate finance. Once a small niche part of finance, private 
equity has now become a mainstream actor in American society. Companies 
held by private equity firms affect the lives of millions of American workers, 
communities, and stakeholders. According to one advocacy group, the top 
five private equity firms are the second largest U.S. employer behind 
Walmart, employing 960,231 Americans.89 In 2016, fewer than 5,000 private 
equity firms held $2.5 trillion in assets under management.90 
Since the eighties, private equity has displayed a unique model and 
economics that have been greatly criticized for the negative consequences of 
using mainly debt or leverage to finance corporate acquisitions.91 Today, 
criticism of private equity economics has resurfaced—Congress has 
considered regulating the industry. The issues raised in the eighties still 
resonate today: does private equity economics benefit the economy by 
improving the operations of the acquired companies and creating jobs and 
wealth for the community? Or, is private equity economics merely a tool for 
private equity principals and a few investors to enrich themselves at the 
expense of other stakeholders, workers, and taxpayers? 
A. The Use of Debt (versus Equity) to Finance the Acquisition of 
Companies 
Most private equity firms finance the acquisition of companies by 
engaging in leveraged buyouts. Typically, the capital structure of a leveraged 
buyout acquisition uses a small portion of equity—which is mainly money 
raised from private equity investors, also known as limited partners—and a 
big portion of debt.92 The use of debt, known as leverage, is central to the 
                                                                                                                           
 
89 What They are Saying About Private Equity, AM. INV. COUNCIL, http://www 
.investmentcouncil.org/private-equity-at-work/education/theyre-saying-private-equity/ (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2017). 
90 Id. 
91 See generally Kenneth Lehn et al., The Economics of Leveraged Takeovers, 65 WASH. U. L. Q. 
163 (1987). 
92 See generally EILEEN APPELBAUM & ROSEMARY BATT, PRIVATE EQUITY AT WORK: WHEN 
WALL STREET MANAGES MAIN STREET 47 (2014) (Debt includes a portion of loan provided by banks 
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private equity model:93 private equity firms acquire viable but undervalued 
companies with solid cash flow.94 The cash flow produced by the company 
will help service the debt used to finance the buyout acquisition.95 The tax 
code tends to favor the treatment of debt compared to equity because debt, in 
the form of interest payments, can be deductible when determining taxable 
profits, whereas the equity—dividends distributed to shareholders or capital 
gains on shares—is not deductible.96 However, the new tax law of 201797 
marks a shift in debt deductibility since the law limits interest expense 
deductibility to 30% of a portfolio company’s adjusted taxable income until 
2021. This might have a significant effect on private equity financing through 
debt as the after-tax cost of financings for LBO’s could significantly increase. 
Other sources of financing, such as equity, may replace debt financing.98 
                                                                                                                           
 
(commercial or investment), hedge funds, and other institutional investors. These are short-term loans 
repackaged into bonds in the form of collateralized loan obligation, “CLO,” or commercial mortgage 
backed securities, “CMBS.” A CLO is a debt obligation that pools multiple loans from businesses and 
passes them through different classes of owners in various tranches. A CMBS is a loan secured by a 
commercial real estate property.). See also Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 14, at 121–46 (Some of these 
bonds are sold to investors as senior secured notes, which provides a claim on the acquired company’s 
assets. Id. Other bonds include junior, unsecured notes that are sold to investors as high-yield bonds or 
“mezzanine debt” (subordinated to senior debt).). Id. at 124–25. 
93 APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 92, at 24 (Citing the company Houdaille a Fortune 500 
company that had “lots of cash on hand, little debt, and an undervalued stock price”; the private equity 
firm purchased Houdaille with 8% equity and 92% of debt.). 
94 See, e.g., BURROUGH & HELYAR, supra note 5, at 371 (Noting that the backbone of any 
successful LBO “is a set of projections: profits sales, and most important, cash flow. Because they dictate 
the amount of debt a company can safely repay, projections are the key to formulating a bid. And the right 
bid means everything to an LBO: the higher price, the higher the debt. Too much debt can crush the 
healthiest companies.”). 
95 Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 14, at 139 (In the early 80s—considered the first wave of 
buyouts—the structure of debt represented 85-to-90% of acquisitions compared to 10-to-15% equity.); 
APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 92, at 3 (A typical public company issues 30% debt and 70% equity. In 
the 2000s, the debt portion of leveraged buyouts financing was reduced to 70% versus 30% equity.); id. 
at 47 (During the second wave, the portion of equity rose to between 25% and 33%. Since the financial 
crisis of 2008, credit conditions have tightened, and the portion of equity is now 40%. Thus, in a typical 
buyout transaction, a private equity firm finances the acquisition of a company with essentially 40% of 
equity and 60-to-90% of borrowed money. That portion of borrowed money is called debt and is also 
known as leverage.). 
96 See generally RUUD A. DE MOOIJ, TAX BIASES TO DEBT FINANCE: ASSESSING THE PROBLEM, 
FINDING SOLUTIONS (2011) (The use of leverage or debt is considered as another source of earnings for 
private equity firms due to the more favorable treatment of debt in the tax code compared to equity: debts 
are tax-deductible and reduce tax liabilities for private equity owners as the interest on debt may be 
subtracted from taxable income, while retained earnings or dividends are taxable as profits.). 
97 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat 2054 (2017) [hereinafter TCJA]. 
98 See generally id. 
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Pouring in huge amounts of debt was initially viewed as a way to 
discipline managers99 because heavy debt payment forces a company to 
tighten its operations and spend money wisely. While the use of debt 
facilitates corporate acquisitions, it can also—when unsustainable—hinder 
economic prospects of a company and lead to bankruptcy.100 In recent years, 
                                                                                                                           
 
99 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305–60 (1976) (This seminal article on 
agency theory notes that shareholders are “principals” and have a residual claim on the company. Directors 
and managers are “agents” of the company and act on behalf of the shareholders to maximize their 
profits.); see also Michael Jensen, Agency and Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and 
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 328 (1986) (Managers must return to shareholders the free cash flow 
supplied by the corporation while using debt to finance new company’s acquisition. Free cash flow is 
monies in excess of the company’s resources that managers, instead of distributing to shareholders, put in 
to costly projects that do not enhance the value of the company. By increasing its debt level, a company 
increases its efficiency by forcing managers with large sums of cash flow to disgorge cash to investors. 
Thus, debt forces discipline on managers and prevents wasting resources on low return projects.). 
For a discussion on examining the corporation as a contractual relation, see, e.g., Lehn et al., supra 
note 91, at 172–73 (Stakeholders, that is, workers, suppliers, creditors, and bondholders, contribute to the 
company’s resources in exchange for a claim in the company’s revenues. Both debtholders and 
stockholders provide financing to a firm in exchange for revenue. Debtholders receive interest payments 
in coupon until the final payment of principal due at maturity; stockholders receive dividend payments on 
the firm’s residual claim. In many respects, debt and equity financing are not very different, as they both 
provide a residual claim on the company’s assets. The difference between debt and equity lies in their 
protection afforded by the law in case the company goes in default: debtholders enjoy more protection 
than equity holders.); see also BURROUGH & HELYAR, supra note 5, at 134 (Borrowing heavily to acquire 
companies results on ruthless cost cutting and sale of unwanted businesses, as every dollar must pay the 
debt load.). 
100 There is a long list of firms filing for bankruptcy due to heavy debt load added by leveraged 
buyout: see, e.g., Lillian Rizzo & Suzanne Kapner, Toys ‘R’ Us, Once a Category Killer, Is Forced Into 
Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 19, 2017, 12:51 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/toys-r-us-once-a-
category-killer-is-forced-into-bankruptcy-1505792620 (The assumption is the risk of bankruptcy in times 
on economic downturn because the company with high debt will not be able to adjust with changing 
market while sustaining its debt.). 
Compare BURROUGH & HELYAR, supra note 5, at 352–53, 371, and APPELBAUM & BATT, supra 
note 92, at 97–101 (Listing a number of bankrupted companies during the financial crisis of 2008-2009. 
A disproportionally high level of private equity backed companies defaulted by the end of 2008. This 
includes Linens ’n Things who filed for bankruptcy then liquidated because they could not find a buyer, 
Fortunoff Fine Jewelry and Silverware, etc.), Creditor Recoveries in Leverage Buyout Defaults in Line 
With Non-LBOs, MOODY’S (June 5, 2012), https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Creditor-
recoveries-in-leveraged-buyout-defaults-in-line-with—PR_247637 (creditor recoveries of U.S. leveraged 
buyouts default are nearly equal to those in non-LBO defaults); see generally GEORGE A. AKERLOF & 
PAUL M. ROMER, LOOTING: THE ECONOMIC UNDERWORLD OF BANKRUPTCY FOR PROFIT 1–74 (1993) 
(Bankruptcy for profit occurs generally when a government provides guarantees for a firm’s debt 
obligations, and other forms of guarantees such as deposit insurance, pension obligations of private firms, 
obligations of large banks, student loans, mortgage finance and influential firms. Thus, a private equity 
firm takes the portfolio company into bankruptcy, with the plan of buying the company back and taking 
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the bankruptcy of private equity sponsored companies burdened with debt is 
also linked with the use of controversial “financial engineering” techniques 
completely unrelated to managers’ discipline.101 
                                                                                                                           
 
it out of bankruptcy. When the company is out of bankruptcy, it resurfaces with fewer debts and often is 
discharged from pension liabilities, which usually are transferred to the government (and taxpayers). In 
this scenario, bondholders and unsecured creditors lose part of their investment, workers often lose their 
jobs, and all or part of their benefits and pensions, which the government (and taxpayers) assume.). 
101 These controversial techniques of debt management include dividend recapitalizations 
(“dividends recaps”), buying one own debt at steep discount and debt exchange. See, e.g., Alex Lykken, 
Understanding Dividend Recaps, PITCHBOOK (Jan. 20, 2014), https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/ 
understanding-dividend-recaps (Dividend recapitalizations (“dividend recaps”) are additional debt 
incurred by a portfolio company to allow the payment of dividends to its shareholders, the private equity 
firm (and its investors) and sometimes the management team of that company.); accord Michael Stothard 
& Dan McCrum, Private Equity Eyes Dividend ‘Recaps,’ FIN. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2012), https:// 
www.ft.com/content/eac31cd6-1d12-11e2-abeb-00144feabdc0 (Dividend recaps are a way for private 
equity firms to extract value from a portfolio company. They were extensively used during the pre-crisis 
years in 2002–2007. Later, private equity firms used dividend recaps to extract value from companies they 
considered under-leveraged (due to the additional equity required to finance a deal during the financial 
crisis). This allowed adding more debt to the under-leveraged transactions (compared to their level of 
equity).); see also Luisa Beltran, Moody’s: PE Firms Took Out at Least 35 Dividend Recaps This Year, 
Worth More than $11 bln, PE HUB NETWORK (July 12, 2012), https://www.pehub.com/2012/07/moodys-
dividend-recaps/ (Reporting that during the peak of the market in 2012, a company such as HCA had 
made more than 6.7 billion in distributions and shares repurchase. Dividend recaps is a principal way 
private equity extract cash from their portfolio company.). Dividend recaps provide investors (private 
equity firms and their investors) with the benefit of immediately cashing their investment without waiting 
for the normal distribution process that usually occurs five-to-seven years after the initial investment 
(when the company exits the portfolio). 
Dividend recaps also decrease the risk of private equity firms and their investors from losing 
money. However, dividend recaps add risk to the portfolio company because they subject it to potential 
financial strain and the risk of bankruptcy. 
Mega deals realized during the boom years between 2002–2007 included a great amount of debt 
that became unsustainable during the financial crisis. To avoid bankruptcy—and lose the entire equity on 
the investment—private equity firms had to reduce the debt burden on companies they owned. 
APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 92, at 80. One way to do this was to have a company buy back its own 
debt on the open market. When a company faces the prospect of bankruptcy, its bond trades at a steep 
discount to the face value. The company can take advantage of the discount and buy back its own debt on 
the open market. See also Serena Ng, Firms Move to Scoop Up Own Debt, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2009, 
12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125080949684547827. This is advantageous for the 
company which can save millions of dollars, but it is disadvantageous for bondholders who are set to lose 
the amount saved by the company. 
Debt exchange is another technique offered by the issuing company to exchange its outstanding 
debt for something else, often cash or new debt. See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, Debt-Exchange Offers Get 
a New Lease on Life, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/20/ 
business/dealbook/debt-exchange-offers-get-a-new-lease-on-life.html?_r=0. This also benefits the 
company by reducing its debt load but at the expense of bondholders who are forced to forfeit earnings 
on the company’s debt so as not to face the bankruptcy of issuing firms. 
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B. Private Equity and the Labor Market 
Job losses and benefit cuts are often associated with private equity take-
overs even if these acquisitions also create opportunities. First, even critics 
of private equity firms recognize the benefit of private equity economics in 
small and middle markets—that is, companies valued between $25 million 
to $1 billion.102 Second, even when a company eliminates jobs or ceases 
operations, workers and the community sometimes benefit. Finally, private 
equity transactions can contribute to saving ailing companies and creating 
jobs.103 
Despite these positive outcomes, the public perception of private equity 
economics remains negative, especially due to high-profile political 
statements that have negatively portrayed the industry.104 
Few reliable studies exist on the employment effects of a takeover, the 
quality of jobs created and the resulting labor relations. Information on 
private companies is scarce.105 Studies sponsored by the private equity 
industry usually emphasize job-creation-post-leverage-buyout 
                                                                                                                           
 
102 APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 92, at 127–60 (Crediting smaller deal size of middle market to 
add value because transactions rely less on debt, as these companies have less collateral to offer than 
larger ones. When a company relies less on leverage, the private equity can contribute to business growth 
and innovation. There are also opportunities to turn-around the acquired company, long-term strategies 
and operation improvement.). 
103 See, e.g., SERV. EMPS. INT’L UNION, BEHIND THE BUYOUTS: INSIDE THE WORLD OF PRIVATE 
EQUITY 31 (2007) [hereinafter SERV. EMPS. INT’L UNION] (Private equity firm Onex buyout of three 
Boeing plants initially cut jobs and pay but also offered stocks to employees for the newly created 
company Spirit AeroSystems. Jobs were initially cut but ultimately added new jobs. When Onex took 
Spirit AeroSystems public, it provided a windfall for workers.). See also APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 
92, at 238, App. tbl.7A.1. 
104 See, e.g., Private Equity Firms Strip Mine German Firms, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Dec. 22, 2006, 
7:16 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/the-locusts-privaty-equity-firms-strip-mine-german-
firms-a-456272.html (In 2005, a senior German politician labelled private equity firms as irresponsible 
“swarms of locusts” interested in short-term profits at the expense of the future of companies they acquire 
and their employee.). See also, e.g., Jeff Mason & Alister Bull, Obama Camp Targets Romney Firm As 
Job-killing “Vampire,” REUTERS (May 14, 2012, 10:57 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
campaign/obama-camp-targets-romney-firm-as-job-killing-vampire-idUSBRE8481JD20120514 (During 
the 2012 U.S. presidential campaign, the private equity industry, labelled as a “job-killing vampire,” had 
to claim that the industry does not destroy jobs and communities.). 
105 APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 92, at 193–238. 
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acquisitions;106 but the data and methodology used are often biased and 
questionable.107 Other studies using empirical evidence support the argument 
that companies post-leveraged-buyouts create fewer jobs than non-leveraged 
companies do.108 In general, findings are consistent with the perceived notion 
of employment insecurity and destruction resulting from private equity 
transactions.109 
Finally, consequences of private equity transactions on workers and 
their communities carry mixed blessings. LBOs can greatly enrich individual 
shareholders of acquired or defunct companies (consequently enriching their 
communities).110 But the impact of private equity deals is clearly negative for 
workers and their communities when workers lose their jobs, pensions, and 
benefits.111 In some instances, the government (and taxpayers) bear the cost 
                                                                                                                           
 
106 See generally, e.g., ROBERT J. SHAPRIO & NAM D. PHAM, AMERICAN JOBS AND THE IMPACT OF 
PRIVATE EQUITY TRANSACTIONS (2008) (Claiming that large private equity firms produce stronger job 
growth than other companies in a same sector.). 
107 Id. (The sponsorship of the study by a private equity trade group and eight large private equity 
firms raise the question of selection bias.). 
108 See generally Steven J. Davis et al., Private Equity and Employment (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 17399, 2011). 
109 There are, however, distinctions to be made among buyout deals. First, going-private deals 
(when a publicly traded company becomes privately held) cut employment at a steeper rate than private-
to-private transactions (independent). Id. at 5–6. Going-private transactions are often associated with poor 
deal execution, as acquisitions occur at market peaks, producing higher valuations and over-leveraged 
transactions. Id. at 30. When this happens, job losses are higher because the acquired company divests 
part of its operations or ceases to exist. Id. By contrast, private-to-private transactions, which represent 
the majority of buyout transactions tend to create robust job growth the first two years post buyout. Id. at 
30–31. In these instances, private-to-private transactions are associated with job reallocation, adjustments, 
and the acquisition of more companies and divestitures. Id. Second, industry types—manufacturing, retail 
and service—exhibit different results toward employment. Id. at 29. Thus, job losses or created by private 
equity buyouts are not a homogenous. Distinctions based on deal size, type and industry. Another factor 
that contributes to negative perception is the attitude exhibited by private equity owners towards the 
workforce and labor unions when a company changes ownership and becomes private equity owned: there 
is little communication or consultation with workers, which can vary from being engaging and 
constructive to outright hostile. See also SERV. EMPS. INT’L UNION, supra note 103. 
110 See BURROUGH & HELYAR, supra note 5, at 540, 541 (Citing the case of Pauline Carter, a retired 
RJR worker, twice widower, who had accumulated 42,500 shares of the company and netted $3 million 
after the LBO. Carter left $2.7 million to a local foundation to support charities. Carter’s case, far from 
isolated, highlights how the buyout also accomplished good deeds in Winston-Salem’s community.). 
111 APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 92, at 193–238 (Analyzing case studies of companies held in 
private equity portfolio. Documenting cuts in jobs, wages and retiree benefits including five U.S. Steel 
Legacy companies acquired by Willbur Ross & Co between 2001–2003; Delphi Corporation acquired by 
John Paulson & Co., and Silver Point Capital in 2009; Hawker Beechcraft acquired by Goldman Sachs 
Capital and Onex Partners in 2007.). 
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of a buyout transaction when the private equity owner does not assume the 
responsibilities of the previous owner.112 
C. Private Equity Fees 
Compensation agreements for private equity and venture capital are 
complex. The exact amount of fees investors and portfolio companies must 
pay has proven difficult to evaluate.113 General Partners receive income from 
their investors (Limited Partners) and portfolio companies. Investors provide 
management fees and share the profit, called carried interest. Management 
fees usually represent 2% of the committed capital, paid quarterly by 
investors. Management fees occur according to various formulas that can 
include committed capital, cost basis of capital or a combination of both.114 
In addition to management fees, General Partners receive carried interest, 
which correspond to an incentive fee based on a fund’s performance. 
Measurement of carried interest can be misleading because the apparent 
simple formula (usually a flat percentage) often leads to various 
interpretations.115 The timing of a carried interest payment is also a factor in 
considering the compensation received by General Partners.116 
General Partners receive an additional stream of income from portfolio 
companies. These are fees paid directly to General Partners and entirely 
controlled by them. General Partners notify when Limited Partners receive 
these fees and normally share them according to the rules defined in their 
                                                                                                                           
 
112 See, e.g., Greg Palast, Mitt Romney’s Bailout Bonanza, THE NATION (Nov. 5, 2012), https:// 
www.thenation.com/article/mitt-romneys-bailout-bonanza/; see also Delphi FAQs—General, PBGC, 
https://www.pbgc.gov/wr/large/delphi/delphifaq (last visited Feb. 16, 2019) (PBGC started to assume 
responsibility of the pension plans after the parent company General Motors and Delphi went into 
bankruptcy and accepted the government bailout.); see also, e.g., Patrick Fitzgerald, PBGC Will Take 
Over Hawker Pensions, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 26, 2012, 8:51 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424127887323530404578203933755282340; see also Hawker Beechcraft Plan Overview, 
PBGC, https://www.pbgc.gov/wr/large/hawker-beechcraft-plan-overview (last visited Feb. 16, 2019). 
113 See generally Kate Litvak, Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements: Understanding 
Compensation Arrangements, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 161, 218 (2009); see also Ludovic Phalippou, Beware 
of Venturing into Private Equity, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 147, 147–66 (2009). 
114 Litvak, supra note 113, at 169. 
115 Id. at 175. 
116 Id. (The author considers timing of the distribution of carried interest as a third element of 
compensation—management fees and carried interest being the first and second respectively.). 
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agreements. These fees include transaction and monitoring fees.117 Other fees 
can be added depending on the agreements. 
Transaction and monitoring fees, though, arise only out of buyout 
agreements and seem not to exist with venture capital.118 General Partners 
charge transaction fees when buying or selling a company that resemble the 
fees investment banks charge for mergers and acquisitions.119 Monitoring 
fees represent the time and effort General Partners spend working alongside 
a company.120 
Evidence suggests that private equity returns do not outperform the 
Standard and Poor’s 500 Index (“S&P 500”).121 Results consistently show 
that private equity returns drift lower (net of fees) than the S&P 500 but 
returns outperform the S&P 500 when adding the fees (gross amount). Only 
when adding fees charged to investors and portfolio companies do private 
equity funds and venture capital earn returns exceeding the S&P 500. 
Surprisingly, the bulk—or two-thirds—of private equity income derives 
from the non-risky portion of the compensation package, that is management 
fees and portfolio companies’ fees (transaction and monitoring).122 
The question then arises, why do sophisticated investors put so much 
money into this type of investment when it offers no liquidity (not readily 
sold) long-term (ten-year period), with compensation terms difficult to 
understand? Some authors argue that sophisticated investors might be fooled, 
or they might misunderstand the information provided123 particularly for the 
                                                                                                                           
 
117 See generally Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity Funds, 23 
REV. FIN. STUD. 2303, 2313, 2309–14 (2010) (Management fees have four methods of assessment: as 
constant percentage of committed capital, a decreasing fee schedule, a constant rate of committed capital 
that can change over the years, and a method using a decreasing percentage. Transaction fees charged to 
portfolio companies resemble merger and acquisitions advisory fees charged by investment bankers. 
Monitoring fees compensate the fund for work performed with its portfolio company.). 
118 Id. at 2313. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 2314. 
121 See generally Steve Kaplan & Antoinette Schoar, Private Equity Performance: Returns, 
Persistence and Capital Flows, 60 J. FIN. 1791, 1791–1823 (2005) (Based on a sample of funds covering 
the years 1980–2001, the average fund return net of fees are roughly identical than those of the S&P 500 
Index.). See also Ludovic Phalippou & Oliver Gottschalg, The Performance of Private Equity Funds, 22 
REV. FIN. STUD. 1747, 1766–67 (2009) (Confirming previous findings by Kaplan & Schoar and noting 
that substantial performance of private equity derives from management fees and not incentive fees.). 
122 Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 117, at 2320 (Results are the same whether the fund is a venture 
capital or buyout.). 
123 See Lerner et al., supra note 85, at 731–64. 
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calculation of fees and returns.124 Since Dodd-Frank, a flurry of negative 
press has erupted on the fees that private equity firms levy on their investors 
and portfolio companies.125 Investors and regulators now question whether 
private equity investment is worth the risk taking into account the enormous 
fees investors pay. For instance, the State of California now requires its state 
pensions to disclose fees paid to private equity managers and other private 
funds.126 Starting in 2017, California public pension plans must disclose fees 
and expenses reported by private equity funds in which the pension plans 
have invested. 
D. Taxing Carried Interest 
Private equity fund managers receive several streams of income and use 
different entities to collect that income.127 The income comes from Limited 
Partners in one part, and in another part, from companies held in the portfolio. 
                                                                                                                           
 
124 See Litvak, supra note 113, at 175 (Finding apparent simplicity in carried interest terms leads to 
interpretation errors.); see also Phalippou, supra note 113, at 155–62 (Citing a statement from Calpers, 
one of the largest private equity investors. In 2008, Calpers made a statement expressing satisfaction with 
the returns received by its private equity investments: from 1990 to 20007, Calpers has invested $25 
billion and has received $19 billion back. This represents 1.5 return, which would be the same than 
investing in the U.S. stock market index fund for the same period. Thus, the author wonders why Calpers 
would be so satisfied for what appears to be a disappointing rate of return.). 
125 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, The Deal’s Done. But Not the Fees, N.Y. TIMES (May 24. 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/business/the-deals-done-but-not-the-fees.html?_r=0; see also 
Mark Maremont & Mike Spector, Blackstone to Curb Controversial Fee Practice, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 
2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackstone-to-curb-controversial-fee-practice-1412714245. 
126 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7514.7 (“California Assembly Bill 2833,” introduced February 19, 
2016), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/15-16/bill/asm/ab_2801-2850/ab_2833_bill_20160219_ 
introduced.pdf (Public investment fund must require disclosures by alternative investment vehicles and 
report the information.). See also James Rufus Koren, Calpers’ Private Equity Fees Under the 
Microscope, L.A. TIMES (July 8, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-pe-disclosure-
20160706-snap-story.html. See also ILPA, ILPA Publishes Landmark Guidance On Private Equity Fee 
Reporting, Institutional Limited Partners Association (Jan. 29, 2016), https://ilpa.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/06/ILPA-Fee-Reporting-Template_Press-Release-FINAL1.pdf (Institutional Limited 
Partners Association (“ILPA”) is a trade association group for limited partners). 
127 Gregg D. Polsky, A Compendium of Private Equity Tax Games 2 (UNC Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 2524593, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2524593 (A partnership, set up as management 
company, provides management services and receives the management fees for each fund. Another entity, 
set as general partner, manages each fund, usually established as limited partner. The general partner 
collects the carried interest.). 
142 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 37:115 
 
Vol. 37, No. 2 (2019) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2019.159 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
Commentators have qualified opaque and convoluted terms drafted in the 
compensation agreement.128 
From Limited Partners, private equity managers collect annual 
management fees for outstanding funded capital commitments. General 
Partners also receive a carried interest, which is profit sharing, based on the 
performance of the portfolio companies. 
The taxation of carried interest, i.e., profit sharing, is the biggest 
loophole that the private equity industry—successfully129—fights to 
preserve. That is, carried interest benefits from the favorable tax rate of long-
term capital gains rather than ordinary income.130 
Typically, the fee structure, referred to as two-twenty, means the 2% 
management fees and 20% carried interest.131 Private equity managers 
receive annual management fees in advance, while the payment of carried 
interest occurs only if the fund produces a return, usually above a stated 
threshold called the hurdle rate or preferred return (often 8%).132 In addition 
to limited partners, private equity managers receive other streams of income 
from the companies held in their portfolios. These are fees paid directly by 
the portfolio company to the private equity owner and, these expenses cover 
for instance, transaction fees, monitoring fees, and advisory fees. 
Tax treatment of these various incomes (management fees—that is, 
income from Limited Partners—and carried interest—that is, income from 
profits) differs. Management fees are taxed as ordinary income, while carried 
                                                                                                                           
 
128 See, e.g., Litvak, supra note 113, at 175–76 (Finding three sources of income: management fee, 
carried interest and a third element being an interest-free loan that venture capitalists receive from LPs. 
Distribution rules allow managers to determine when carried interest get paid because they can decide the 
time of liquidation, distribution to investors.); but see Phalippou, supra note 113, at 149–51 (Finding four 
set of fees from managers: annual management fee, carried interest, portfolio management fees, and extra 
fees and costs imposed on investors.). 
129 See TCJA, supra note 97 (The new tax law has not ended the carried interest loophole.); see 
also, e.g., Sahil Kapur et al., How the Carried Interest Break Survived the Tax Bill, BLOOMBERG: POL. 
(Dec. 22, 2017, 11:26 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-22/cohn-mnuchin-split-
helped-break-trump-s-carried-interest-pledge. 
130 See generally Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity 
Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
131 Id. at 4. 
132 See Victor Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return, 31 IOWA J. CORP. L. 77, 87 (2005) (Hurdle 
rates or preferred returns are found with private equity buyout funds and do not exist with venture capital. 
It means that contrary to buyouts, venture capitalists share the profits with their investors regardless of 
the fund performance.). 
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interest receives the preferential treatment of capital gains.133 This means that 
2% management fees receive a federal marginal tax rate, which ranged up to 
39.6% before the tax reform of 2017, whereas the 20% profits or carried 
interest are taxed at a 20% rate (it was 15% before 2013). 
The tax treatment of private equity incomes allows managers to 
maximize revenue while reducing tax liability by converting ordinary income 
into capital gains to benefit from the preferential rate134 and the deferral of 
income tax.135 
Conversion means income from profits interest are taxed at a long-term 
capital gains rate rather than higher ordinary income rates.136 Tax deferral 
means payment of investments will occur at a future date instead of the time 
they occur. Under partnership law, the receipt of interest from profits is not 
a taxable event; thus, it is not taxed upon receipt, but deferral occurs when 
profits are distributed.137 
Deferral of income tax confers a timing advantage for private equity 
managers. With carried interest treated as capital gains, managers can choose 
to pay tax at a later date when the interest materializes. For private equity 
firms, this means portfolio companies, which represent illiquid securities 
                                                                                                                           
 
133 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-885, PRIVATE EQUITY RECENT GROWTH 
IN LEVERAGE BUYOUTS EXPOSED RISKS THAT WARRANT CONTINUED ATTENTION (2008). 
134 See generally Greg D. Polsky, Private Equity Management Fee Conversions (Fla. State Univ. 
College of Law, Law, Bus. & Econ. Working No. 08-18, 2008), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1295443 
(Conversion means changing the character of an income to tax it at a preferential rate. The income 
recharacterization often discussed by scholars and observers pertains to the treatment of interest from 
profit—with the character of labor income, thus, ordinary income—converted into carried interest. Less 
argued, is the conversion of management fees—ordinary income—converted into carried interest.). 
The issue whether carried interest should be taxed as ordinary income or capital gains is a question 
of partnership tax principles and the treatment made when a partner receives a partnership interest in 
return for services. In the current law, partnership equity has two components: capital interest and profits 
interest. 
See Fleischer, supra note 130, at 10 (Profit interest gives rights to the partner in the partnership but 
does not have a current liquidation value, while capital interest provides not only a right in the partnership 
but also a current liquidation value. Id.). See also Fleischer, supra note 132, at 109 (Because capital 
interest has a determinable value, services rendered by the partner become immediately taxable income. 
Profit interests, however, having no liquidation value readily determinable, are not taxable income.). 
135 See Chris William Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers 
with Profits Shares: What Is It? Why Is It Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071, 1075 (2008) (Controversies of 
profits interests or carried interest have consequences on how managers are taxed and the resulting effects 
on their investors.). 
136 Id. 
137 See Fleischer, supra note 130, at 11. 
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interests difficult to value, are taxed at liquidation (usually during the exit 
phase of the private equity strategy). 
Deferred taxation of income benefits the time value of money because 
the taxpayer holds securities in his portfolio longer and taxes paid in the 
future are cheaper than taxes paid in the present due to the potential earning 
capacity of money and inflation.138 Deferral of taxation provides to private 
equity firms an interest-free loan from the government139 or a subsidy that 
private equity firms take advantage of. 
The benefit of deferred compensation works for partnership 
compensation structured as profits interest and not capital interest.140 As 
noted, conversion and deferral provide a tax advantage for private equity 
managers. However, their investors receive more taxable ordinary income 
equivalent to the profits interest private equity mangers convert and defer.141 
The detriment to investors is often reduced as most are tax-exempted 
entities.142 
Through the years, Congress has introduced several bills to change 
taxation on carried interest and align it, or at least part of its income, with 
ordinary income. None of these bills have become law.143 Fairness dictates 
                                                                                                                           
 
138 See generally DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22689, TAXATION OF HEDGE 
FUND AND PRIVATE EQUITY MANAGERS 9 (2014) (Tax deferral refers to the timing of tax payments which 
allows a taxpayer to control when he pays tax: paying tax in the future rather than today.). 
139 Polsky, supra note 127, at 8 (Arguing that carried interest compensation provides four distinct 
benefits: (1) deferral of tax liability from services provided throughout the life of a fund has the “effect of 
an interest-free loan from the government,” (2) when income is realized, it is taxed at the lower rate of 
15% instead of 35%, (3) there is no income tax, and (4) absorption of capital losses and capital carryovers 
are possible unlike with management fee income.). 
140 Fleischer, supra note 130, at 13. 
141 See Sanchirico, supra note 135, at 1075–76. 
142 See PETER R. ORSZAG, THE TAXATION OF CARRIED 10 (2007), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/ 
default/files/110th-congress-2007-2008/reports/09-06-carriedinterest_testimony.pdf. 
143 See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 TAX L. REV. 89, 104 (2008) (The Blackstone 
bill or “PTP” (publicly-traded partnership) bill was introduced in 2007 by senators Baucus and Grassley 
in reaction to the private equity giant Blackstone and its decision to go public in March 2007. Private 
equity going public was a trend in the 2007 years as several firms such as Fortress, or Apollo filled to 
become publicly traded companies. The Blackstone bill offered to tax publicly traded private equity firms 
with carried interest at the same rate of 35% as ordinary income. The rationale was to tax Blackstone and 
the like entities using PTP structure as corporation for tax purpose. The bill did not intend to affect other 
private equity firms remaining privately held. The bill viewed as a response to private equity 
gamesmanship did not prosper in Congress.). 
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closing the loophole by taxing carried interest as ordinary income.144 Carried 
interest represents profit sharing or performance-based pay, which is a 
common compensation scheme in many industries, including in the steel 
industry. While employees in the steel industry receive performance pay 
taxed as ordinary income, millionaire owners of private equity receive the 
same type of profit sharing compensation taxed at a lower rate of capital 
gains.145 This tax loophole benefits private equity owners to the detriment of 
the government and taxpayers.146 The revenue provided by carried interest or 
losses incurred by the government is not clear since no public data exists. 
However, some estimates value the carried interest loophole as high as $180 
billion over ten years.147 Notwithstanding controversial business practices, 
private equity firms have managed to evolve free of regulation until the 
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. 
III. THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE EQUITY BY THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
A. Arguments Opposing Regulation of Private Equity 
The Dodd-Frank Act is not the first legislation attempting to regulate 
private funds. Starting in the 1980s, the SEC and legislators have introduced 
various propositions and bills aiming at regulating or curbing private equity 
activities.148 
                                                                                                                           
 
144 See generally EILEEN APPELBAUM & ROSEMARY BATT, FEES, FEES AND MORE FEES: HOW 
PRIVATE EQUITY ABUSES ITS LIMITED PARTNERS AND U.S. TAXPAYERS (2016). 
145 See APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 92, at 30. 
146 Id. 
147 Victor Fleischer, How a Carried Interest Tax Could Raise $180 Billion, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK 
(June 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/06/business/dealbook/how-a-carried-interest-tax-
could-raise-180-billion.html?_r=2 (A Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation provided much modest 
estimate of $15.6 billion over 10 years.); see also A Tax Break that Wall Street Cannot Defend, FIN. TIMES 
(Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/8b330a4a-babe-11e5-bf7e-8a339b6f2164 (Additional critics 
have also concluded that carried interest is a “tax break that Wall Street cannot defend” because, as noted 
above, private equity owners take little risk with their own money while they “are receiving payment for 
a service, namely to invest money on behalf of limited partners in the fund, while losses on investments 
fall on their clients alone.”). 
148 Venture Capital Improvements Acts of 1980: Hearing on H.R. 7554 and H.R. 7491 Before the 
Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. and Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong. 
(1980) [hereinafter Venture Capital Hearing]; see also Kenneth Lehn, A View from Washington on 
Leveraged Buyouts, in THE HIGH YIELD DEBT MARKET: INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE AND ECONOMIC 
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Opponents of private equity (and private funds) regulation have raised 
several objections that justify, in their view, why private equity should 
continue to benefit from the many exemptions of securities laws.149 
Opponents of regulation argue the following:150 private funds are already 
subject to regulation and market discipline. Even if private funds do not 
register under the Advisers Act, they are nevertheless subject to its provisions 
against fraud, insider trading, and manipulation. Market discipline also holds 
advisers of private equity funds accountable to their investors.151 
Another argument points that exemptions of private funds serve 
important interests. The so-called “regulatory gap” has a negative meaning 
that infers a gap needs to be closed with more regulation.152 It does not 
acknowledge the purpose of the gap, leaving flexibility to investors to 
privately organize their businesses.153 Closing a gap is adverse to investors 
and the economy as a regulatory gap affords freedom of entrepreneurship to 
expand, innovate, and create jobs for the overall economy. In addition, the 
SEC should not spend its limited resources on regulating exempted investors 
able to take care of themselves; rather, it should concentrate on other 
priorities.154 
Moreover, opponents of regulation warn of potential costs to the 
financial market and the economy when private funds require additional 
regulatory scrutiny. Do the costs associated with the new regulation carefully 
balance the interests at stake?155 The answer might differ depending on the 
type of funds. Adding more regulation could adversely affect the industry by 
reducing efficiency, liquidity to the securities markets, capital flow to 
innovations, or restructuring of companies.156 
                                                                                                                           
 
IMPACT 154 (Edward I. Altman ed., 1998) (In 1989, the fallout from the RJR Nabisco deal included many 
congressional hearings on LBOs related to tax, banking, securities and labor laws.). 
149 See Regulating Hedge Funds and Other Private Investment Hearing, supra note 30. 
150 Id. at 82–87 (Commissioner Troy A. Paredes did not endorse the position of Andrew J. Donohue, 
the SEC Director of the Division of Investment Management and opposed registration of hedge funds and 
other private funds. Kathleen L. Casey similarly dissented. Id. at 87–89.). 
151 Id. at 83. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 84. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 85. Compare Regulating Hedge Funds and Other Private Investment Hearing, supra note 
30, with Venture Capital Hearing, supra note 148. The venture capital industry advanced the same 
arguments back in the 1980s. At the time the National Venture Capital Association was composed of 80 
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Finally, even if legislators authorize regulation of private funds, should 
this regulation occur through the Securities Act of 1933,157 the Company Act 
of 1940158 or the Advisers Act of 1940? Another regulatory option could 
expand the rulemaking authority of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.159 
                                                                                                                           
 
capital firms with combined assets of more than $1.5 billion. Id. at 76. In the 1980s, many venture 
capitalists were licensed under the Small Business Administration (“SBA”)—entity of the Small Business 
Investment Company (“SBIC”)—to provide professionally managed investment funds to risky 
companies. The adoption of limited partnerships came in the late 1970s. Limited partnerships became the 
most popular business organizations because they allowed managers to receive stock options or other 
forms of performance-based compensation—unlike SBICs or publicly traded venture capital firms. Also, 
limited partnerships did not have SBICs’ investment restrictions (imposed by the Investment Company 
Act of 1940). 
157 See Venture Capital Hearing, supra note 148, at 77–78 (Proposing bill H.R. 7554 to amend the 
Securities Act of 1933 to make it easier and less expensive for businesses to raise capital from 
sophisticated investors by reducing long and costly disclosure requirements imposed on issuers. 
Accredited investors can fend for themselves, and these investors neither need or want Government 
protection to insure sufficient disclosure is made to them. Furthermore, resales from one accredited 
investor to another accredited investor should not require registration and should benefit from 
exemption.). 
158 See Investment Company Act of 1940, supra note 71, for the definition of investment company. 
Registration under the Investment Company Act is generally not favored because it restricts fund 
investments and trading activities. See also Venture Capital Hearing, supra note 148, at 78–79 (The 
Investment Company Act contains many prohibitions that are not compatible with private funds model: 
to exempt venture capital companies from registering and allowing qualified venture capital companies 
to raise capital from the public. Although the public is a large source of capital, the Investment Company 
Act prevents the pubic from investing with risky investments like venture capital companies. Other 
Investment Company Act issues relate to the expensive provision of Section 17 (15 U.S.C.S. § 80a-17) 
requiring an SEC exemptive order for transactions between a registered investment company and its 
investee “affiliates,” and equity incentives for managers, which is a big issue for private fund.). 
159 See Regulating Hedge Funds and Other Private Investment Hearing, supra note 30, at 38 
(statement of Andrew J. Donohue, Director, Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n) (the SEC could 
condition the use of exemptions under Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act. Thus, 
imposing certain requirements believed to be necessary to protect investors and enhance transparency, 
which would depend on the type of fund. This approach would allow adaptability to changing markets 
and unnecessarily subjecting private funds to the Investment Company Act requirements.). But see id. at 
86 (Commissioner Paredes objecting to expanding of SEC rulemaking authority as it does not provide 
regulatory predictability and creates uncertainty.). 
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B. Rationale for Private Equity Regulation 
In 2009, many congressional discussions occurred aiming at regulating 
hedge funds and other private funds.160 While capital markets became 
increasingly interwoven, private funds operated outside a regulatory 
framework. Reliable data on private funds prevented the government and 
regulators from evaluating the risk, if any, they presented to the entire 
economy. The public, lawmakers, and commentators viewed hedge funds 
and private equity businesses with suspicion. Preventing systemic risk 
resulting from the financial crisis provided the opportunity to expand 
regulation to these entities.161 
The Securities and Exchange Commission has long advocated for 
regulation of private funds.162 The Commission supported registering private 
fund advisers under the Investment Advisers Act because for the past two 
decades, hedge funds, private equity and venture capital have played an 
increasingly essential role in capital markets, but the regulatory setting has 
not evolved to deal with the growth and market importance of these funds. 
The SEC has incomplete data about the advisers of these funds, and this 
represents a regulatory gap the Commission wished to close. The SEC 
attempted to close the gap by requiring all hedge fund advisers to register 
under the Investment Advisers Act,163 but this initiative failed before an 
appellate court in 2006.164 
                                                                                                                           
 
160 Id.; see generally Douglas M. Branson, A Return to Old-Time Religion? The Glass-Steagall Act, 
the Volker Rule, Limits on Proprietary Trading, and Sustainability, 11 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 359 (2014). 
161 But see Venture Capital Hearing, supra note 148 (A legislation to register venture capitals (and 
private equity) did not prosper because Congress believed registration through the Investment Company 
Act or Advisers Act was an unnecessary impediment to economic growth.). 
162 Id.; see also Regulating Hedge Funds and Other Private Investment Hearing, supra note 30, at 
34–38 (statement before the Subcommittee to support the registration of private funds presented by 
Andrew Donohue, Director of Investment Management of the Commission). 
163 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 275, 279 (2005). 
164 See Goldstein, 461 F.3d 873 at 874; see also Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978) (Holding that General Partners of a partnership were “investment 
advisers’ within the meaning of the Investment Advisers Act and deleting an earlier footnote stating that 
hedge funds were investment advisers to each of the limited partners and not the partnership.). 
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Admitting the importance each fund plays in the efficiency of the capital 
market, the regulatory regime can tailor the particularity of each actor with 
their business model, risks to investors and the markets.165 
The option to regulate private funds through the Investment Adviser Act 
has advantages for investors because it allows them to obtain accurate, 
reliable, and complete information about the industry and assesses the risk 
private funds may pose. Regulators and Congress, for the first time, could 
see the size and importance of the private fund industry, and this would better 
protect investors and market integrity.166 
Registration also would allow the Commission to enforce the fiduciary 
responsibilities of investment advisers, as the antifraud provisions of the 
Advisers Act enforce fiduciary duties, such as avoiding conflicts of interest 
(or disclosure).167 Registration provides the SEC the authority it needs to 
enforce the Act with on-site compliance examinations and identify issues 
investors cannot determine for themselves,168 such as safekeeping, or 
performance representation. Registration could also work as a deterrent since 
registration can prevent market abuse and manipulation of trading activities, 
                                                                                                                           
 
165 Regulating Hedge Funds and Other Private Investment Hearing, supra note 30, at 37 (For 
instance, the Advisers Act is scalable to small advisers with little resources and the Commission can rely 
on existing rules and regulations to accommodate advisers both large and small (69% of registered 
advisers have 10 or fewer employees).). 
166 Id. at 87–89 (Commissioner Casey departed from the testimony of the Director of Investment 
Management. Commissioner Casey believed that even if expanding investment adviser registration to 
managers of private funds seems the best option, Congress has to clearly identify its objective for doing 
so. Regulation of private pools is important to assess risk to the overall financial system, but it is also 
important to clearly differentiate funds to identify the standard to which they should be subject, what 
information to share with regulators, and how information is used. Regulators can make use of information 
about leverage or financial positions of multibillion dollar hedge funds, while such information might not 
be necessary for a small venture capital or family office. Congress should limit the authority of the SEC 
to obtain information tailored to a set of standards and information based on the size and nature of the 
adviser. It is also important to acknowledge additional regulation, even if necessary, should not constitute 
a substitute by investors of their duty of care and diligence in choosing an investment adviser.). 
167 Id. at 37. 
168 Venture Capital Hearing, supra note 148, at 187–96 (Based on enforcement activities against 
small business investment companies (“SBICs”) registered under the Investment Company Act, a sample 
of SEC enforcement activities involved: (i) breach of fiduciary duty by officers and directors of a company 
who invested in other companies owned and controlled by the directors and officers, (ii) self-dealing by 
an investment company in numerous affiliated transactions not approved pursuant to the Investment 
Company Act, (iii) abuse of position by a president of an investment firm responsible for making loan 
decisions and requesting prospective borrowers to hire him as an attorney for loans made by the 
investment firm, (iv) overvaluation of portfolio companies, paying excessive interest rates on borrowings 
from affiliates and violation of the firm own investment policies.). 
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insider trading or improper short-selling activities.169 Registration also serves 
the purpose of keeping unfit persons from using private funds to perpetrate 
fraud. Finally, investment advisers registered with the Commission must 
develop a comprehensive compliance program administered by a chief 
compliance officer. 
C. The Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010 
Title IV of Dodd-Frank entitled the Regulation of Advisers to Hedge 
Funds and Others, adds a new section to the Investment Advisers Act of 
1940: The Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act (the “Private 
Fund Act”).170 It requires advisers to “private funds” with assets under 
management over $150 million to register with the SEC and submit periodic 
records, reports and bookkeeping.171 
The rule prescribes that investment advisers of a private fund must 
register with the Securities and Exchange Commission or the State (if less 
than $150 million under management), unless an exception applies.172 A 
private fund adviser means an issuer that is an investment company under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, except in those cases when one uses 
Section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act.173 The Dodd-Frank Act eliminates the 
private adviser exemption under which an adviser of a fund did not have to 
register if he did not hold himself out as an investment adviser and did not 
have more than 15 clients. The new provision requires any investment 
adviser to register.174 
There are exemptions to the registration requirement, including three 
new exemptions created by the Dodd-Frank Act: for advisers of (i) venture 
capital funds, (ii) private funds with less than $150 million in assets under 
management, and (iii) foreign private advisers.175 
                                                                                                                           
 
169 See Regulating Hedge Funds and Other Private Investment Hearing, supra note 30, at 37. 
170 15 U.S.C.§ 80b-20, LEXIS NOTES (2018). 
171 See generally Seth Chertok, A Comprehensive Guide to Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and the 
Rules Promulgated Thereunder, 12 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 125 (2012). 
172 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a) (2018). 
173 Id. 
174 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (2018). 
175 See 17 C.F.R. § 275 (2011). 
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1. The Exception: Some Private Funds are Exempt from Registration 
The Advisers Act and Dodd-Frank contain several exemptions from 
registration and create two new types of exemptions: first, the “specifically 
exempted” advisers, not subject to reporting or recordkeeping 
requirements176 (for example, foreign private advisers), and second, another 
category of exempt reporting advisers, exempt from registration but NOT 
reporting: for instance, exempt reporting advisers advising venture capital 
funds and those advisers to private funds with assets under management of 
less than $150 million.177 For these type of advisers, exemption means the 
advisers do not register with the Commission but must report their activity in 
a limited fashion.178 
Exempt reporting advisers must complete and file reports on the Form 
ADV,179 which is electronically filed through the Investment Adviser 
Registration Depository (IARD).180 Unless a temporary hardship181 is 
requested, the initial Form ADV must be filed within 60 days of relying on 
the exemption. 
Exempt reporting advisers do not have to register with the Commission. 
However, they still report, albeit lighter reporting compared to non-exempt 
advisers. The reporting consists of the same Form ADV used by advisers to 
register with the SEC.182 Exempt reporting advisers complete only Part 1A 
of the Form ADV. They must list basic information183 (Identifying 
Information, Form of Organization, Control Persons), like whether they are 
                                                                                                                           
 
176 Id. (Registration does not apply to a foreign private adviser.); 15 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2018) 
(prescribing maintenance of records for examinations by the Commission will not apply). 
177 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2010) (add Advisers Act Sections 203(l) and (m)). 
178 See Investment Advisers Act § 204(a) (1940) (Mandates registered advisers to maintain records 
and authorizes examinations by the Commission unless the adviser is “specifically exempted from 
registration pursuant to section 203(b)” of the Investment Advisers Act. Sections 203(l) and 203(m) are 
not “specifically exempted” because they are still subject to reporting and recordkeeping with the 
Commission.). 
179 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-4(a) (2018). 
180 SEC’Y AND EXCH. COMM’N, FORM ADV 5–7 (2017). 
181 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-4(e) (An adviser can apply for a temporary hardship exemption if 
unanticipated technical difficulties (such as computer malfunction or electrical outage) prevent from filing 
to IARD system.). 
182 Form ADV has a dual role: registration for investment advisers and report for exempt reporting 
advisers. Information is collected for the Commission, which can seem confusing because even if not 
registered, an exempt adviser still faces SEC scrutiny. 
183 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM ADV 1–6, 10, 24–25 (2017). 
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exempt reporting advisers and for which exemption they qualify (SEC 
Reporting by Exempt Reporting Advisers).184 Other information aims at 
detecting potential conflicts of interest with advisers’ other businesses (Other 
Business Activities)185 and affiliations (Financial Industry Affiliations and 
Private Fund Reporting), along with the report on the disciplinary history of 
the adviser and its employees (Disclosure Information).186 In addition to the 
items on Form ADV, exempt reporting advisers must complete all the 
relevant sections of schedules A, B, C and D of Form ADV. 
Note that exempt reporting advisers must also provide the extensive 
information on private fund reporting found in item 7.B (Financial Industry 
Affiliations and Private Fund Reporting) and Section 7.B of Schedule D 
(Private Fund Reporting).187 
2. The Venture Capital Fund Adviser Exemption 
The Private Fund Act exempts venture capital fund advisers from 
registration188 and limits the reporting requirement.189 
Venture capital defines any private fund that190 (1) pursues a venture 
capital strategy;191 (2) holds no more than 20% of the fund’s capital 
contributions in non-qualifying investments;192 (3) does not use leverage 
                                                                                                                           
 
184 Id. at 8. 
185 Id. at 15–16. 
186 Id. at 16–17, 22–26. 
187 Id. at 17–18, 47–55. 
188 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2010) (“Exemption of and reporting by venture capital fund advisers.”). The 
Act required the Commission to define the terms “venture capital” no later than a year after the enactment 
of the Act and issued a final rule on July 21, 2011. 
189 See 17 C.F.R. § 275 (2011). 
190 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(I)-1(a)(1) (2010) (A venture capital is a private fund as opposed to publicly 
traded, one that represents to investors and potential investors that it pursues a venture capital strategy 
(“holding out”).). 
191 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(I)-1(c)(2) (2010) (“Equity security has the same meaning as in section 
3(a)(11) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(11)) and § 240.3a11-1 of this 
chapter.”). 
192 See id. at 23–30 (Noting that to qualify as an exempt reporting adviser, an adviser must advise 
a venture capital fund that acts as a private fund that invests in qualifying investments or short-term 
holdings. A qualifying investment is defined as: (i) equities acquired directly by the private fund; 
(ii) equity securities issued by a qualifying portfolio company in exchange for directly acquired equities 
issued by the same qualifying portfolio company; and (iii) equity securities issued by a company of which 
the qualifying portfolio company is a majority-owned subsidiary, or a predecessor, and is received in 
exchange for directly acquired equities of the qualifying portfolio company. This definition aims at 
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other than qualifying short term borrowing;193 (4) does not offer redemption 
rights to its investors;194 (5) has not registered under Section 8 of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940;195 and is not a business development 
company pursuant to Section 54.196 The rule also includes a grandfather 
                                                                                                                           
 
differentiating venture capital from other funds such as hedge funds or private equity. Venture capital 
invests directly in portfolio company to finance the company business or its expansion, as opposed to a 
buyout strategy. Eighty percent of the fund’s capital must be invested in a qualifying investment with no 
more than 20% in non-qualifying investments. A qualifying investment excludes a secondary sale, as the 
equity security must be acquired “directly” by the private fund from the qualifying portfolio company. In 
addition to a qualifying investment, a venture capital fund can hold short-term holdings, that is, cash, and 
cash equivalents, U.S. Treasuries with remaining maturity of 60 days or less, and shares of an open-end 
management investment company registered under Section 8 of the Investment Company Act of 1940.). 
See also 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(I)-1(c)(4) (Noting a qualifying investment is an equity security issued by a 
qualifying portfolio company. The qualifying portfolio company (i) is an investment by the private fund, 
at the time of the investment, not reporting or foreign traded (and does not control or is not controlled by 
another company that is reporting or foreign traded); (ii) does not borrow or issue debt in connection with 
an investment in a company and distribute the proceeds of the borrowing or issuance in exchange for the 
private fund’s investment; and (iii) is not an investment company or a private fund.); see also 17 C.F.R. 
§ 275.203(I)-1(a)(3) (Noting reporting or foreign traded status is analyzed at the time of the acquisition. 
Investment does not disqualify the portfolio if the company becomes subsequently a reporting or foreign 
traded company, so long as the 20% threshold of non-qualifying investments is met. A venture capital 
fund may hold up to 20% of the fund’s capital commitment that are not qualifying investments or short-
term holdings. The 20% limit is calculated based on a basket of non-qualifying investments at the time a 
non-qualified investment is made.). 
193 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(I)-1(a)(3) (2018) (The absence or limited use of leverage was the 
motivation for allowing a venture capital exemption, compared to other funds, whose leverage was 
considered to create systemic risk. As defined, a venture capital fund “does not borrow, issue debt 
obligations, provide guarantees or otherwise incur leverage, in excess of 15% of the private fund’s 
aggregate capital contributions and uncalled committed capital” so long as the borrowing, indebtedness, 
guarantee or leverage is for a non-renewable term of no longer than 120 calendar days. The limitation 
does not apply when the venture capital fund guarantees a qualifying portfolio company’s obligation up 
to the amount of the value of the private fund’s investment in the qualifying portfolio. The use of debt and 
borrowing transactions is limited to the company’s ordinary course of business (cash management, 
payroll, inventory and the like), so it delineates venture capital strategy from leverage transactions used 
by buy-out funds or hedge funds. A qualifying portfolio company excludes a company that borrows “in 
connection with” the private fund’s investment and distributes to the private fund the proceeds of such 
borrowing “in exchange for” the private fund’s investment. Thus, a venture capital fund could finance and 
provide loans to portfolio companies so long as the financing meets the definition of equity security or is 
within 20% threshold for non-qualifying investments.). 
194 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(I)-1(a)(4) (2018) (Explaining that the definition of venture capital excludes 
redemption rights to investors, except in extraordinary circumstances (usually events beyond the control 
of the investor). However, investors are entitled to receive distributions on a pro rata basis. This definition 
does not differentiate between hedge funds and private equity.). 
195 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(I)-1(c)(4)(iii) (2018) (Explaining that to benefit from the registration 
exemption, a venture capital fund must be a private fund not registered under the Investment Company 
Act of 1940 or a business development company.). 
196 See generally 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(l)-1 (2018). 
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provision for preexisting venture capital funds.197 The adoption of this 
definition differentiates venture capital funds from other funds such as 
private equity funds, because the venture capital size is small compared to 
other funds, and the investment strategy does not concentrate on the public 
market, which limits potential systemic risk. 
3. The Private Fund Adviser Exemption 
The Private Fund Act creates an exemption for private fund advisers and 
requires the Commission to exempt from registration any investment adviser 
acting solely as an adviser to private funds and having assets under 
management in the United States of less than $150 million.198 Pursuant to the 
Act, the Commission adopted Rule 203(m)-1.199 
The exemption applies to U.S. advisers acting solely as advisers to 
qualifying private funds,200 to the extent the assets under management201 do 
not exceed $150 million.202 A qualifying private fund is a private fund that is 
not registered under Section 8 of the Investment Company Act and does not 
qualify as a business development company.203 
The regulatory assets under management include securities portfolios 
for which the investment adviser provides continuous and regular 
supervisory or management services as of the date of filing Form ADV.204 
The value of the regulatory assets under management is calculated on current 
                                                                                                                           
 
197 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(I)-1(b) (2018) (Describing how a private fund can also qualify as venture 
capital if (1) it represented to investors pursuing a venture capital strategy; (2) has sold securities to 
investors that are not related persons to any investment adviser of the private fund before December 31, 
2010; and (3) and does not sell securities to any person after July 21, 2011.). 
198 Dodd-Frank Act, § 408 (2010). 
199 See generally 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(l)-1 (2018). 
200 Investment Adviser Act of 1940, § 202(29) (Defining private fund as “an issuer that would be 
an investment company, as defined in section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-
3), but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act.”). 
201 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(m)-1(a)(1)(2) (2018). 
202 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(m)-(d)(1) (2018) (Describing how private fund assets, which are the assets 
under management of the qualifying private fund must not exceed $150 million. Form ADV Item 5.F 
defines regulatory assets under management to provide a uniform method of calculation.). 
203 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(m)-(d)(5) (2018). 
204 See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM ADV (2017). 
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market value or fair value of the assets.205 The frequency of calculations 
occurs annually in accordance with General Instruction 15 of Form ADV.206 
Section 203(m)’s exemption applies to investment advisers of private 
funds acting solely as advisers to private funds and having assets under 
management in the United States of less than $150 million.207 The less than 
$150 million assets requirement applies only to advisers whose principal 
office and place of business is located in the United States; it does not apply 
to a non-United States adviser with a principal place of business outside the 
United States.208 
4. The Foreign Private Adviser Exemption 
The Dodd-Frank Act eliminates the private adviser exemption and 
creates a foreign private adviser exemption instead.209 The foreign private 
adviser exemption exempts a foreign adviser from registration and reporting. 
The Dodd-Frank Act defines “foreign private adviser” as an investment 
adviser who: (1) has no place of business in the United States; (2) has fewer 
than 15 clients and investors in the United States in private funds advised by 
the investment adviser; (3) has aggregate assets under management of less 
than $25 million; and (4) does not hold itself out to the public in the United 
States as an investment adviser, nor acts as a business development company 
pursuant to Section 54 of the Investment Company Act of 1940.210 
                                                                                                                           
 
205 Id. at 7–10. 
206 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(m)-1(c) (2018) (Referring to General Instruction 15 to the Form ADV 
which mentions the annual updating of the $150 million threshold to maintain the exempt reporting 
adviser status.). 
207 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(m). 
208 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(m)-1(d)(2) (2018) (Referring to Section 275.222-1(a) which defines place 
of business as: “(1) an office at which the investment adviser regularly provides investment advisory 
services, solicits, meets with, or otherwise communicates with clients; and (2) any other location that is 
held out to the general public as a location at which the investment adviser provides investment advisory 
services, solicits, meets with, or otherwise communicates with clients.”). 
209 Dodd-Frank Act, § 403 (2010). 
210 Dodd-Frank Act, § 402(30) (2010); see also Investment Act of 1940 § 203(a)(3); Investment 
Advisor Act of 1940, § 202(a)(30); 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(30)-1 (2018) (Defining terms such as: 
“investor,” “in the United States,” “place of business” and “assets under management.”). 
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D. Private Funds Reporting Requirements 
As noted above, the Dodd-Frank Act amends the Investment Advisers 
Act by adding The Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act 
(herein “Private Fund Act”), a new section for private funds.211 The Private 
Fund Act is aimed at private funds and new recordkeeping and reporting 
provisions to the existing reporting requirements. 
In 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted amendments 
to existing rules to implement Title IV, the regulation of advisers to hedge 
funds and other private funds of Dodd-Frank.212 The Act has considerably 
modified the original Form ADV to help oversee investment advisers and 
collect additional data from them.213 Notably, the biggest modification 
consists of the private funds category,214 which gathers information about 
advisers and the funds they advise. In addition, data related to advisory 
businesses are expanded (such as the adviser’s employees, type of clients 
advised, compensation arrangements, etc.) as well as information about 
potential conflict of interests. Finally, Form ADV adds reporting on 
information about non-advisory activities and financial industry 
affiliations.215 
                                                                                                                           
 
211 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a) (Amending Section 202(a) of Investment Advisors Act of 1940 by adding 
(29) “private fund” and defining it as “an issuer that would be an investment company, as defined in 
section 3 of Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. § 80a-3), but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of 
that Act.”). 
212 See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. IA-3221, RULES IMPLEMENTING AMENDMENTS TO 
THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940 (2011), SEC.GOV, https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/ia-
3221.pdf (Discussing Release No. IA-3221 that follows the propositions of rules and amendments, 
Release No. 3110 Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 3110 (Nov. 19, 2010).). 
213 See generally Form ADV (Paper Version): Uniform Application for Investment Adviser 
Registration and Report Form by Exempt Reporting Advisers, SEC.GOV, https://www.sec.gov/about/ 
forms/formadv-part1a.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2018) [hereinafter Form ADV]; see also Instruction 2 to 
Form ADV (Paper Version) Uniform Application for Investment Advisor Registration and Report Form 
by Exempt Reporting Advisers General Instructions, SEC.GOV, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/ 
formadv-instructions.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2018) [hereinafter Form ADV Instructions] (Explaining 
that the form is a uniform application used by investment advisers to register with the SEC, the states, 
amends the registration. It also allows to report as an exempt reporting adviser to the SEC or one or more 
state securities authorities, amends these reports and submit an exempt reporting adviser.). 
214 Id. at Item 7.B and Section 7.B of Schedule D. 
215 See id. (Discussing Item 7 related to financial industry affiliations.). 
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1. Private Fund Reporting for Investors: Item 7.B and Section 7.B(1) 
of Schedule D 
The Private Fund Adviser Section of Form ADV represents a significant 
amendment as it requires investment advisers to identify if they advise 
private funds. Registered or exempt reporting advisers must answer the 
question whether they are an adviser to a private fund. Aside from 
exceptions, this triggers the reporting on Section 7.B(1) of Schedule D for 
each private fund advised,216 regardless of the form of the private fund or if 
the fund is a related person of the adviser.217 
Section 7.B(1) of Schedule D contains two parts: one part has 
information about the private fund while the other part has information on 
service providers, also known as “gatekeepers.” 
Information about the private fund aims at expanding basic data 
reporting for a better understanding of private funds’ organizations and 
operations; in that aspect, an adviser must provide information about the 
name of the fund, private fund identification number, names of General 
Partners, directors, whether the fund qualifies for exclusion from the 
definition of investment company under Section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940218 and other information on whether the 
private fund is a “master fund” in a master-feeder arrangement.219 The 
adviser must also select what type of fund it advises based on a defined list: 
hedge fund, liquidity fund, private equity fund, real estate fund, securitized 
asset fund, venture capital fund, or other private equity fund.220 
The form reduces financial information to a minimum, as it requires 
only the current “gross asset value” of the private fund.221 However, the form 
does not include other sensitive information in the final version of the release, 
                                                                                                                           
 
216 Prior to the adoption of SEC Release No. IA-3221, Section 7.B of Schedule D required an 
adviser to private fund, a limited partnership or limited liability company, to only provide basic 
information such as name of the fund, of the general partner or manager, in case for instance of solicitation 
of clients advised. 
217 See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM ADV: INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1-A, GLOSSARY OF TERMS, 
RELATED PERSON 7 (2017), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/ia-3221-appc.pdf. 
218 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM ADV: PART 1-A, SECTION 7.B(1) A. OF SCHEDULE D 47 (2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv-part1a.pdf. 
219 Id. at 48. 
220 Id. at 50; see also id. at 24. 
221 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM ADV 50 (2017). 
158 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 37:115 
 
Vol. 37, No. 2 (2019) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2019.159 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
such as disclosure of the fund’s net asset value, description of the fund assets 
and liabilities by class and categorization in fair value hierarchy as per the 
generally accepted accounting principles, or the percentage of ownership in 
each fund by types of beneficial owners.222 
2. Private Equity Disclosure for the Assessment of Systemic Risk 
Some private funds, those registered with the SEC, are required to 
disclose additional information through the Form PF.223 On October 31, 
2011, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission adopted Form PF final joint 
rules.224 225 Form PF collects information of private funds to assess systemic 
risk. The Dodd-Frank legislation mandates that the Commission collects 
information to assess systemic risk posed by private funds and provides the 
information collected to the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC” 
or “Council”),226 a newly created governmental body under the Department 
of Treasury.227 
Thus, Form PF represents the main monitoring tool to collect systemic 
risk information. The Commission and the CFTC also use Form PF as an 
attribute for their other regulatory programs, examinations, investigations, 
and investor protection. Unlike Form ADV, information collected on Form 
PF is not shared with the public. The SEC uses and shares the information on 
                                                                                                                           
 
222 Few argued the disclosure of detailed financial information was too sensitive and carried 
competitiveness issues. 
223 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM PF: REPORTING FORM FOR INVESTING ADVISERS TO PRIVATE 
FUNDS AND CERTAIN COMMODITY POOL OPERATORS AND COMMODITY TRADING ADVISERS 1 (2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formpf.pdf [hereinafter SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N]. 
224 COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. IA-3308, 
REPORTING FORM FOR INVESTMENT ADVISERS TO PRIVATE FUNDS AND CERTAIN COMMODITY POOL 
OPERATORS AND COMMODITY TRADING ADVISORS (2011). 
225 Form PF is adopted jointly by the SEC and CFTC for Sections 1 and 2 while Sections 3 and 4 
are unique to the SEC. 
226 See generally Dodd-Frank Act § 404 (2018). 
227 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 111, 112 (2018) (Explaining that the FSOC’s mission is to assess systemic 
risk posed by private funds with the mission to (i) identify risks to the financial stability of the United 
States arising from financial distress or failure of large interconnected bank holding companies or nonbank 
financial companies or outside the financial services marketplace, (ii) promote market discipline, by 
eliminating expectations of government bailout and, (iii) respond to emerging threats to the stability of 
the United States financial system.). 
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Form PF with other agencies including the CFTC and the FSOC228 on a 
nonpublic and confidential basis. 
3. Who Must File Form PF 
An investment adviser must complete and file Form PF if it:229 (i) is 
registered or required to register with the SEC; or with the CFTC as a 
commodity pool operator (“CPO”) or with a commodity trading adviser 
(“CTA”), (ii) manages one or more private funds, and (iii) had at least $150 
million in private fund assets under management in the latest fiscal year.230 
Thus, Form PF excludes State-only registered advisers, those with less than 
$150 million in assets under management and venture capital advisers. 
In practice, most private fund advisers filing Form PF must complete 
only Section 1 of the Form PF on an annual basis. Only a large private fund 
manager—defined as any large hedge fund adviser, large liquidity adviser or 
large private equity adviser231—must complete other sections of the Form 
PF. These private fund advisers required to complete and file beyond Section 
1 of Form PF are: 
● Large hedge fund advisers with at least $1.5 billion of assets under 
management,232 
● Large liquidity fund advisers having at least $1 billion in combined 
money market and liquidity fund assets under management,233 and 
                                                                                                                           
 
228 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 204(b)(A)(B) (2018) (Mandating the SEC to collect reports 
filed by private fund and make information available to the Financial Stability Oversight Council to assess 
systemic risk. The SEC and CFTC may use information collected for their regulatory programs, 
examinations, and investigations in relation to investor protection.). 
229 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 223, at 2 (The Form PF is organized in diverse sections to 
tailor the risk profile of a private fund. As such, the Form PF contains five sections: Section 1 must be 
filed by all private funds to this form, Section 2 is filed by large hedge fund advisers, Section 3 is filed by 
large liquidity fund advisers, Section 4 by large private equity advisers and Section 5 is filed by advisers 
who request a temporary hardship exemption.). 
230 See id. at 1. 
231 See id. at 59. 
232 See id. at 2; see also id. at 59 (Providing definition for large hedge fund adviser and referring 
back to Instruction 3.). 
233 Id. at 55, 59 (At the last day of any month in the fiscal quarter immediately preceding the most 
recently completed fiscal quarter; defining large liquidity fund adviser by reference to filing Section 3 of 
Form PF and refers to Instruction 3. Combined money market and liquidity fund assets under management 
is defined as “with respect to any adviser, the sum of (i) such adviser’s liquidity fund assets under 
160 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 37:115 
 
Vol. 37, No. 2 (2019) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2019.159 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
● Large private equity advisers, those with at least $2 billion in 
private equity fund assets under management as of the last day of 
the most recently completed fiscal year.234 
Regulators have determined that large private funds (hedge funds, 
liquidity funds and private equity funds) were the entities posing systemic 
risk due to the amount of assets they managed. Contrary to hedge funds and 
liquidity funds, for a private equity, the amount of assets under management 
that could represent a threat to the system was raised to $2 billion (as opposed 
to $1.5 and $1 billion for hedge funds and liquidity funds respectively). In 
other words, private equity funds appear the least risky of the riskiest assets. 
Following the enactment of rules mandated by the Private Fund Act, the 
SEC proceeded with an in-depth examination of the private equity industry. 
IV. THE SEC PRESENCE EXAM INITIATIVE PROGRAM AND ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIVITIES 
The fiduciary obligation is the general legal duty of fairness that the law 
of partnership imposes on its members. When dealing with partnership 
activities, members of a partnership must treat each other fairly and disclose 
material activities to the partnership.235 The laws of partnership mirror the 
agency relationships existing between an agent and its principal, where the 
agent owes fiduciary duties to the principal.236 
With private equity limited partnership agreements, violation of the duty 
of loyalty by General Partners is often at issue. The SEC has raised this 
concern since the 1980s237 and others, such as the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) released a report to that effect in 
2009.238 The Private Equity Conflicts of Interest report addresses regulatory 
concerns and notes that conflicts of interest happen at four different stages: 
                                                                                                                           
 
management; and (ii) such adviser’s regulatory assets under management that are attributable to money 
market funds that it advises.”). 
234 Id. at 59 (Defining large private equity adviser by reference to filing Section 4 of Form PF and 
referring to Instruction 3.). 
235 ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 221–83 (4th 
ed. 2013). 
236 See Meinhard, 164 N.E. 545 at 546. 
237 Venture Capital Hearing, supra note 148. 
238 See TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS, PRIVATE EQUITY CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST (2009), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD309.pdf. 
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fund raising, investment, management and exit. Disclosure to Limited 
Partners seems the proper action to mitigate this specific risk. Since Dodd-
Frank, private equity and other private funds must register with the 
Commission.239 Under the Investment Advisers Act, conflicts of interest that 
violate fiduciary duties violate securities laws. 
In 2012, the Commission240 started the Presence Exam Initiative 
program.241 The program aimed to engage with the private equity industry by 
gathering information, identifying issues, and assessing risk. By 2014, the 
Commission made more than 150 examinations of newly registered private 
equity advisers, with the goal of examining 25% of newly registered funds.242 
The examinations revealed that half of the advisers violated their fiduciary 
duties to their funds and their Limited Partners,243 even though mechanisms 
to avoid conflicts existed in most cases. 
Organizational documents of partnerships usually provide an Advisory 
Board and Limited Partnership Agreements (“LPAs”). LPAs contain 
mechanisms by which the adviser can disclose potential conflicts of interest 
for review and approval by the Advisory Board. The Advisory Board can 
waive or approve a course of action as to any conflict, allowing the adviser 
to proceed with its actions without exposure to any potential liability to the 
fund. Often, advisers bypass procedures set in place, usually when they come 
to fee sharing, fee shifting and the use of consultants. 
A. Non-Sharing Monitoring Fees 
LPAs often indicate that the adviser may receive fees from its portfolio 
companies for services provided by the adviser (this includes fees for break-
                                                                                                                           
 
239 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
240 Within the SEC, the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (“OCIE”), is 
responsible for conducting examination of registrants. OCIE has created the Private Funds Unit (“PFU”), 
composed with veterans of private equity industry, and specialized in examinations of advisers to private 
funds. PFU conducts risk-based examinations to identify situations or behaviors posing significant risk to 
investors, or which may violate federal securities laws and regulations. 
241 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, LETTER TO INDUSTRY REGARDING PRESENCE EXAMS (2012), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/letter-presence-exams.pdf. 
242 See Bowden, supra note 63; see also Marc Wyatt, Acting Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections 
and Examinations, Private Equity: A Look Back and a Glimpse Ahead, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (May 13, 
2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/private-equity-look-back-and-glimpse-ahead.html. 
243 Id. 
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ups, origination, commitment, and monitoring). Some LPAs include 
accelerated monitoring fees and “evergreen” fees (which are renewed 
automatically after an initial term of ten years even if the company is no 
longer in the portfolio). These transaction fees from portfolio companies are 
in addition to management fees paid by Limited Partners (ranging from 
0.75% to 1.5%).244 Fees received by portfolio companies usually go to offset 
management fees by limited partnerships. LPAs can contain the following 
language: 
The Management Fee shall be reduced in any given quarter by an amount equal 
to fifty percent 50% of any break-up, origination, commitment, broken deal, 
topped bid, cancellation, monitoring, closing, financial advisory, investment 
banking, director or other transaction fees received by the General Partner or any 
Affiliate thereof during the prior quarter from Portfolio Investments.245 
However, the adviser needs to inform the fund and Limited Partners when it 
receives monitoring fees, accelerated fees or other fees, so it shares them with 
the funds and Limited Partners.246 Also, if the allocation methodology is not 
disclosed, this can result in the adviser apportioning fees for its advantage at 
the expense of the fund and Limited Partners.247 
B. Shifting Expenses 
An adviser shifts expenses in various ways by transferring expenses 
between several funds when it manages or allocates portfolio company 
                                                                                                                           
 
244 See, e.g., WL Ross & Co. LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4494, at 3 (Aug. 24, 2016). 
245 Id. at 4 (LPA defined “assets of the Partnership” invested in securities of companies). 
246 See, e.g., Blackstone Management Partners L.L.C., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4219 
(Oct. 7, 2015) (The adviser inadequately disclosed to limited partners and Limited Partnership Advisory 
Committee (composed with selected limited partners) the termination of monitoring fees and receipt of 
accelerated future monitoring fees. Only the monitoring fees were disclosed to the funds and limited 
partners prior to their commitment to the fund but the practice of accelerated monitoring fees were not. 
These were subsequently disclosed via distribution notices, quarterly management fee reports or SEC 
filings after the adviser had already taken accelerated fees.). 
247 See WL Ross & Co. LLC, supra note 244, at 5 (The private equity fund adviser failed to disclose 
its fee allocation practices to some private equity Funds it advised resulting for the Funds to pay higher 
management fees of $10.4 million between 2001 and 2011. LPAs provided that transactions fees received 
by the adviser would offset quarterly management fees payable by the Funds to the adviser by 50%. But 
between 2001 and 2011, the adviser adopted a different methodology to allocate transaction fees which 
resulted in retaining significant amount of those fees for itself rather than distributing them to the Funds: 
here the allocation to the funds were based upon their relative ownership percentages of the portfolio 
company. Consequently, the adviser received around $10.4 million more in management fees.). 
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expenses between different funds, or when it misallocates expenses between 
the adviser and the fund.248 
C. The Use of Consultants to Avoid Sharing Fees 
This practice occurs when an adviser terminates a portfolio company’s 
advisory fees and replaces them with an agreement between an adviser’s 
affiliate and the portfolio company. In this case, fees paid directly to the 
affiliate, instead of the adviser are no longer shared with Limited Partners, 
and no longer offset management fees.249 
From 2014 and 2016, the SEC brought six enforcement actions against 
private equity advisers. The cases all reached settlement. It is not clear if the 
Commission will step up its enforcement activities as suggested by some 
commentators,250 or if it will consider a new course of action. 
CONCLUSION 
The Dodd-Frank Act has fulfilled part of its objective to protect private 
equity investors by forcing private equity managers to disclose information 
on their operations. In addition, unflattering news headlines have influenced 
private equity advisers to modify some controversial fee practices.251 
                                                                                                                           
 
248 See, e.g., JH Partners, LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4276 (Nov. 23, 2015) (From 
2006 to 2012, the adviser and some principals provided $62 million in direct loans to the Funds’ portfolio 
companies (interim financing for working capital and other urgent matters) without disclosing it to the 
Funds and its limited partners. The securities interest by the adviser and principals were senior to equity 
held by the Funds. The adviser failed to disclose the loans or the seniority of the loans to the advisory 
board, nor did the adviser obtain the advisory board consent.). 
249 See, e.g., Fenway Partners, LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4253 (Nov. 3, 2015) 
(The adviser did not disclose to the Funds and limited partners that the portfolio companies terminated 
their payment obligations under the Management Services Agreements and replaced them with consulting 
agreements with an affiliate. Thus, the limited partners were deprived from the advisory fee offset afforded 
by portfolio companies’ payments.). 
250 See APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 92. 
251 See, e.g., Mark Maremont & Mike Spector, Blackstone to Curb Controversial Fee Practice, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackstone-to-curb-controversial-fee-practice-
1412714245; see also Gretchen Morgenson, The Deal’s Done. But Not the Fees, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/business/the-deals-done-but-not-the-fees.html?r=0; see 
also, e.g., Yves Smith, NY Times Gretchen Morgenson Exposes More Layers of Private Equity Fee 
Chicanery, NAKED CAPITALISM (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2015/10/ny-times-
gretchen-morgenson-discusses-more-layers-of-private-equity-fee-chicanery.html. 
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Investors demand more transparency252 and state legislatures, such as in 
California, now impose new disclosure requirements for those public pension 
plans that have invested in private equity or other private funds.253 Starting 
in 2017, public pension plans must disclose fees and expenses reported by 
private equity funds in which the pension plans have invested.254 
Disclosure has provided greater transparency about the business of 
private equity. The increased SEC scrutiny started in 2014 has uncovered 
unfair practices and violations of fiduciary duties that sophisticated investors 
could not detect on their own. Notwithstanding this improved transparency, 
the Dodd-Frank Act still falls short of imposing the main tools securities law 
uses to protect investors: that is, full and fair disclosure. In other words, 
Dodd-Frank does not provide all the required protections that are important 
for investors to assess the quality of their investments and make informed 
decisions: first, like public companies, private equity should periodically 
publish their financial results by using accounting standards that make sense 
for private equity funds. Second, while the industry uses the internal rate of 
return (“IRR”) to measure the performance of private equity funds, scholars 
have criticized this measurement and offered the public market equivalent 
(“PME”) that compares private equity funds’ return with the public market 
equivalent.255 Financial results should include the results of companies held 
in portfolio, fees charged to investors and portfolio companies, and the 
income of private equity managers. These measures would not add to the 
current disclosure of Form PF, but investors and the public could have access 
to it (it could be 10-K or 10-Q or making public part of the information 
contained in Form PF). These disclosures will allow an effective alignment 
of interests between private equity managers and their investors, because it 
                                                                                                                           
 
252 ILPA Publishes Landmark Guidance on Private Equity Fee Reporting, INST. LTD. PARTNERS 
ASS’N (Jan. 29, 2016), https://ilpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ILPA-Fee-Reporting-Template_ 
Press-Release-FINAL1.pdf. 
253 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7514.7 (2018) (West 2018) (Public investment fund must require 
disclosures by alternative investment vehicles and report the information.). 
254 Id. 
255 See Phalippou, supra note 113, at 159 (The IRR is not a good measurement because it does not 
give the actual return received by investors and the fund’s real worth. It provides arbitrary results as funds 
manager can report the performance by pooling several funds instead of reporting each fund separately. 
Bias comes in when higher performance, especially obtained in fund early days, can hide bad 
performance.). 
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will provide appropriate tools to compare and make sure that what a fund has 
advertised corresponds to the reality as seen in financial results. 
Since private equity no longer represents a niche investment but touches 
all aspects of the economy, it defies belief that such an asset does not have a 
clear and reliable measurement method to gauge the return on that 
investment. At minimum, investors should not question the reality of returns 
generated by their investment. 
Having access to detailed financial data could enhance the likelihood 
that investors use the anti-fraud provision under the Exchange Act 10b and 
rule 10b-5.256 This provision provides a private right of actions for private 
equity investors and does not require the registration of an investment adviser 
with the SEC. It has nevertheless, been largely overlooked by private equity 
investors who usually do not bring issues to courts to confront GPs.257 
Investors dissatisfied with a fund’s performance prefer to withdraw from 
consecutive funds raised by the same GP.258 One explanation of this absence 
of lawsuits is the lack of quality information provided by GPs that limits the 
possibility of litigation. To bring an action 10b-5, investors need to show a 
material misrepresentation or omission, scienter, in connection with the 
purchase and sale of a security and, a causation. Thus, by limiting disclosure 
and the kind of information provided to investors, GPs also limit the 
possibility of litigation.259 The limited options to exit an investment through 
a secondary market also hinder the chances of 10b-5 actions.260 Investors 
should negotiate ex ante exit options to better serve their interests. 
                                                                                                                           
 
256 See Spindler, supra note 68, at 325 (all a fund has to do to remain exempt from the antifraud 
provision are the three ingredients of little to no disclosure to investors, provide little to no control and 
reduce investors exit to a fund); see also Kenneth J. Black, Private Equity & Private Suits: Using 10B-5 
Antifraud Suits to Discipline a Transforming Industry, 2 MICH. J. PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 
271 (2013) (predicting disclosure of private equity advisers will trigger lawsuits by investors). 
257 See Rosenberg, supra note 48, at 367 (Investors do not litigate because they rely on “market 
forces” and “reputational constraints” to force venture capitalist to maximize investment return. Investors 
are also “wary of being perceived as litigious” which can curtail their chance of additional investment in 
the future. Thus, the importance of reputation for managers as well as investors, id. at 394.); contra Henry 
Ordower, The Regulation of Private Equity, Hedge Funds, and State Funds, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 295, 312–
13 (2010) (Detecting market conditions in violation of conflicts of interest and anti-fraud statutes may be 
difficult to detect.); accord Black, supra note 256 (registering with SEC will enable investors to sue 
private equity firms based on securities law anti-fraud provision 10b-5). 
258 See Ordower, supra note 257, at 310–11 (Preferring to “withdraw from the fund quietly,” even 
when the investor has a private right of action afforded by securities law.). 
259 See Spindler, supra note 68, at 331. 
260 Id. 
